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Abstract 
While many community-driven development (CDD) initiatives may be 
successful, their impact is often limited by their small scale.  Building on past and 
ongoing work on CDD, this study addresses the fundamental question:  how can CDD 
initiatives motivate and empower the greatest number of communities to take control of 
their own development?  What are the key contextual factors, institutional arrangements, 
capacity elements, and processes related to successful scaling-up of CDD, and, 
conversely, what are the main constraints or limiting factors, in different contexts?  
Drawing upon recent literature and the findings from five case studies, key lessons on 
how best to stimulate, facilitate, and support the scaling-up of CDD in different 
situations, along with some major challenges, are highlighted. 
Lessons include the need for donors and supporters of CDD, including 
governments, to think of the process beyond the project, and of transformation or 
transition rather than exit.  Donor push and community pull factors need to be balanced to 
prevent ￿supply-driven, demand-driven development.￿  Overall, capacity is pivotal to 
successful CDD and its successful scaling-up over time.  Capacity is more than simply 
resources, however; it also includes motivation and commitment, which, in turn, require 
appropriate incentives at all levels.  Capacity development takes time and resources, but 
it is an essential upfront and ongoing investment, with the capacity and commitment of 
facilitators and local leaders being particularly important.  A ￿learning by doing￿ 
culture￿one that values adaptation, flexibility, and openness to change￿needs to be 
fostered at all levels, with time horizons adjusted accordingly.  The building of a library 
of well-documented, context-specific experiences through good monitoring, evaluation, 
and operational research will be useful in advocating for improvements in the contextual 
environment. 
Ultimately, for CDD to be sustained, it should be anchored within existing 
contextual systems (government), frameworks (e.g., PRSP), and processes 
(decentralization), even where these are imperfect.   iii
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1.  Introduction 
Community-driven development (CDD) recognizes that poor people are prime 
actors in the development process, not targets of externally designed poverty reduction 
efforts.  In CDD, control of decisions and resources rests with community groups, who 
may often work in partnership with demand-responsive support organizations and service 
providers, including elected local governments, the private sector, nongovernmental 
organizations (NGOs), and central government agencies. 
Experience has shown that, given clear rules of the game, access to information, 
and appropriate support, poor men and women can effectively organize to provide goods 
and services that meet their immediate priorities.  Not only do poor communities have 
greater capacity than generally recognized, they also have the most to gain from making 
good use of resources targeted at poverty reduction (Alkire et al. 2001). 
According to the World Bank￿s Voices of the Poor, based on interviews with 
60,000 poor people in 60 countries, poor people demand a development process driven 
by their communities.  When the poor were asked to indicate what might make the 
greatest difference in their lives, they responded:  (1) organizations of their own so they 
can negotiate with government, traders, and NGOs; (2) direct assistance through 
community-driven programs so they can shape their own destinies; and (3) local 
ownership of funds, so they can end corruption.  They want NGOs and governments to be 
accountable to them (Narayan and Petesch 2002). 
CDD￿s potential is increasingly recognized.  Individual studies have shown that 
CDD can increase the effectiveness, efficiency, and sustainability of projects or 
programs, making them more pro-poor and responsive to local priorities.  Other 
objectives include developing capacity, building social and human capital, facilitating 
community and individual empowerment, deepening democracy, improving governance, 
and strengthening human rights.  A recent paper by the World Bank￿s Development 
Research Group finds the evidence for these claims to be mixed (Mansuri and Rao 2003).  2 
There are indeed examples of success, but there are few rigorous evaluations￿even of 
small-scale CDD￿that clearly delineate what works, where, and why. 
The Issue of Scale 
CDD is promoted by governments, multilateral agencies, and NGOs alike, but 
with some exceptions, initiatives are usually small-scale.  The potential for wide-reaching 
impact, through adoption by a large number of communities, has not yet been 
demonstrably realized.  Though it is no longer true to say that CDD operates at the 
margins, it has yet to fully infiltrate the mainstream when large-scale programs are at 
stake.  No matter how effective a scattering of small-scale initiatives are, the achievement 
of national and international goals, including the Millennium Development Goals, will 
not be possible without effective large-scale action. 
The following statement from the World Bank website encapsulates the rationale 
for scaling up CDD and is the starting point for this study: 
The ultimate goal of CDD projects is to move from being ￿islands of excellence￿ that 
serve and empower a handful of communities, to operating at a national scale, where all 
regions of the client country can benefit from the project￿s approach.  By ￿scaling up,￿ 
the aim is to reach the greatest possible number of poor people, and to motivate and 
empower the greatest number of communities to take control of their own development.
1 
There are many other definitions of scaling-up￿or what, two decades ago, used 
to be referred to as ￿going to scale.￿  One is bringing ￿more quality benefits to more 
people over a wider geographical area, more equitably, more quickly, and more lastingly￿ 
(IIRR 2001).  The focus of this paper is ultimately on achieving large-scale, sustainable 
impact of CDD.  Such a focus necessarily includes the environment/context within which 
such initiatives emerge and grow.  Past work has examined the relationship between the 
scaling up of community-driven initiatives and the ￿scaling down￿ of governmental 
power, responsibility, and resources (e.g., Uvin and Miller 1994). 
                                                 
1 See http://lnweb18.worldbank.org/ESSD/sdvext.nsf/09ByDocName/SectorsandThemesScalingUp. 3 
But what exactly is being scaled up to achieve this large-scale impact￿
technologies, processes, projects, innovations, methodologies?  The four core features of 
CDD, which form part of the World Bank Africa Region￿s Vision for CDD (Binswanger 
and Aiyar 2003) provide some guidance: 
•  Real participation and empowerment:  including devolution of authority and 
resources, community cofinancing, local participation in all stages of project 
design, and availability of technical assistance and facilitation from higher 
administrative levels; 
•  Accountability:  horizontal and downward to peers, not just upward to central 
levels; 
•  Technical soundness:  context-specificity; designing in phases; ensuring full 
participation; administrative, fiscal, and political decentralization; full utilization 
of local capacities; use of clear field-tested manuals and tools for each actor; 
provision of technical advisory services; 
•  Sustainability:  fiscal, asset, environmental, and social. 
In the last two years, there has been an upsurge in interest in how to go from 
numerous small-scale successes￿￿boutiques￿￿to large-scale impact.  Driven in large 
part by the World Bank, there have been several recent initiatives, reports, and papers on 
scaling-up.  This is one of them, and others include Mansuri and Rao￿s (2003) review of 
the evidence for CDD effectiveness, Binswanger and Aiyar￿s (2003) discussion of the 
theoretical underpinnings and design implications of CDD upscaling, and Hancock￿s 
(2003) paper on scaling up ￿good practice￿ in support of the Bank￿s Rural Development 
Strategy. 4 
2.  Objectives 
The aim of this synthesis is to compare case study findings with those of earlier 
work in order to elicit core features, tendencies, success/failure factors for given contexts, 
and to highlight challenges that need to be confronted to maximize the potential of CDD 
for large-scale impact.  Comparison will necessarily be indirect as the studies were not 
originally designed to be directly comparable.  These case studies differ from many 
others in that they are of community-based initiatives not directly supported by the World 
Bank, but instead were carried out by a multidisciplinary team outside the World Bank.  
The ultimate goal was the same, however, to synthesize experience, add to the growing 
body of knowledge of what works, and thus respond to the fundamental question of how 
CDD initiatives can motivate and empower the greatest number of communities to take 
control of their own development. 
To operationalize the findings, our study will be structured to answer the 
following questions: 
•  What are the key conditions, elements, and processes relating to successful 
scaling-up of CDD? 
•  Conversely, what are the main constraints or limiting factors, in different 
contexts? 
Through examining the conditions and processes depicted in Figure 2 in the five 
case studies and past literature, we hope to derive widely applicable principles and 
lessons as to how best to stimulate, facilitate, and support the scaling-up of CDD in 
different contexts￿as well as what not to do. 
A caveat is required here.  Not all of the case study examples conform entirely to 
the strict definition of CDD, though they are all community-based development 
initiatives that seek to shift control over decisionmaking and resources toward 5 
communities.  This broadening of the scope allows for inclusion of more experiences 
from which to distill findings and generate lessons. 
3.  Conceptual Framework 
This study accepts the notion that, while CDD initiatives that succeed in a given 
context are not transferable per se, there are certain basic operational principles related to 
success that may be effectively applied more widely.  These principles broadly relate to 
the particular set of institutional arrangements (see Figure 1) and capacities and processes 
that underpin and facilitate successful CDD initiatives in given contexts.  These 
conditions and processes￿including those relating to central and local government￿also 
Figure 1￿Examples of common institutional arrangements for CDD 
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Partnerships between CBOs 
and local governments 
  Partnerships between CBOs 
and NGOs/private firms 
  Direct partnerships between 
CBOs and central government 
or central fund 
Source:  Alkire et al. 2001. 
Community-
based 
organizations 
Community-
based 
organizations
Community-
based 
organizations 
NGOs and 
private firms 
Local or 
municipal 
government
Elected local 
or municipal 
government 
NGOs and 
private firms
Central 
government or 
central fund 
Central 
government or 
central fund 
Local or 
municipal 
government
Central 
government or 
central fund 6 
affect the potential for CDD initiatives to effectively scale up.  One other important 
dynamic element comprises the triggers, catalysts, or ￿sparks￿ for scaling up. 
Figure 2 is an initial conceptual framework portraying the relationships between 
the following integral conditions and processes: 
•  Context includes the macroeconomic, social, cultural, political, and historical 
conditions and trends in which the CDD initiatives have taken root and are being 
scaled up.  The literature suggests that even where there is spontaneous diffusion, 
there may be a limit￿a ￿context roof￿￿dictated by such contextual factors.  In 
order to maximize impact, it will be important to anticipate such boundaries and 
develop a plan for surmounting them. 
•  Institutional arrangements relate to the particular configuration of community-
based organizations (CBOs), civil society organizations (CSOs), NGOs, or local 
and central government (LG and CG) as per the typology developed by the World 
Bank (Figure 1).  Where there is provincial government involvement (e.g., India), 
this would also need to be included (between central and local).  Another level, 
not depicted here, is that of donor involvement. 
•  Capacity is defined here as ￿the ability of a person, community, or organization 
to take control of its own destiny and manage and direct its development process 
through an iterative process of assessment, analysis, and action￿ (Gillespie 2001), 
and includes the quantity and quality of human resources (skills, time, knowledge 
etc.) and social, organizational, financial, natural, and material resource.  It also 
includes such factors as authority, power, responsibility, incentives, leadership, 
and systems of problem-solving, decisionmaking, and communication. 
•  Triggers, catalysts, or ￿sparks￿ for scaling up￿the motivating or driving forces 
e.g., a successful pilot project, a charismatic individual leader, or a change in the 
local or global context.  There may be a combination of factors/events coming 
together.  Such triggers/catalysts may come unexpectedly or they may be 
deliberately planned, emerging from the felt need among certain stakeholders to 7 
show large-scale impact.  It will be important to recognize the type and source of 
such factors/events. 
Figure 2￿A schematic overview of processes of scaling up community-driven 
development 
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Scaling Up Processes 
How does scaling-up occur?  Through what types of process?  Scaling up 
processes may be considered a subset of CDD processes that relate to all aspects of 
decisionmaking, from problem assessment and causal analysis to choice and 
implementation of relevant actions.  These processes include the community 
decisionmaking on initial priorities. 
To help structure our analysis of the five case studies, and other experiences, a 
scaling-up taxonomy, adapted from Uvin and Miller (1994) and Korten (1980), is 
developed here.  Essentially four types of scaling up processes are differentiated: 8 
•  Quantitative, where a program expands in size, geographical base, or budget 
(also referred to as ￿scaling out￿); 
•  Functional, involving increases in the types of activities and integration with 
other programs;  
•  Political, involving increases in political power and engagement with wider 
political processes;  
•  Organizational, involving increases in organizational strength. 
At any time during scaling-up, one or more of these processes may be underway 
(see Table 1). 
Table 1￿Taxonomy of scaling up 
Quantitative scaling up (or scaling out) 
Spread  Increasing numbers of people spontaneously adhere to the organization and its programs, 
perceiving them to serve their interest/preferences. 
Replication  A successful program (methodology and organizational mode) is repeated elsewhere. 
Nurture  A well-staffed and well-funded outside agency, using a specific incentive-based methodology, 
nurtures local initiatives on an increasingly large scale. 
Integration  A program is integrated into existing structures and systems and, in particular, government 
structures after it has demonstrated its potential. 
Functional scaling up 
Horizontal  Unrelated new activities are added to existing programs, or new programs are undertaken by 
the same organization. 
Vertical  Other activities related to the same chain of activities as the original one are added to an 
existing program (i.e., upward or downward linkages are made). 
Political scaling up 
First generation  Essentially service delivery. 
Second generation  Community capacity development for self-reliant action. Through better information and 
mobilization, an organization￿s members or local communities are stimulated to participate in 
the body politic. 
Third  Beyond the community, influence policy reform to foster an enabling environment. This may 
involve networking and aggregation of organizations into federative structures designed to 
influence policy. 
Fourth  Beyond specific policies, catalyze social movements, and/or direct entry of grassroots 
organizations (or their leaders) into politics (either through creating or joining a political 
party). 
Organizational scaling up 
Internal 
management 
Increasing organizational capacity and improved management processes (links to effectiveness 
and efficiency). 
Financial viability  Increasing financial viability/autonomy, including self-financing, through subcontracting, 
consultancy or fees for service. 
Institutional 
diversification 
Both internally and externally (including diversification of donors) and linkages with other 
actors/organizations. 
 9 
There are several other classifications of scaling up processes.  Hancock (2003), 
for example, differentiates between organizational growth and institutional and policy 
change￿both of which encompass direct and indirect routes.  Organizational growth 
could be direct through replication or spread, or indirect through the formation of 
partnerships and integration.  Institutional and policy change could be direct, via capacity 
development and mainstreaming, or indirect through advocacy and lobbying. 
Another system is employed in the Kecamatan (KDP) program in Indonesia, 
which differentiates three main types of scaling-up processes:  physical, social, and 
conceptual: 
•  Physical scale-up depends on simple systems￿systems for disbursement, 
decisionmaking, and implementation, monitoring, and evaluation, which are fully 
described in manuals. 
•  Social scale-up arises from the experience of success by stages, and is manifested 
in the development of community capacity to work synergistically toward 
common goals in relation with local government. 
•  Conceptual scale-up implies that the meaning and dimensions of CDD will 
continue to evolve, CDD principles will be progressively incorporated into policy 
goals, institutions, and new poverty programs, and there will be an increasing 
understanding of the larger issues that affect community well-being. 
Myer (1984) refers to scaling up through three different approaches￿expansion, 
explosion, and association.  Another classification, used in the past by IIRR (2001), 
suggests that scaling up needs to be viewed from the following perspectives: 
•  Institutional:  the need to look at the processes and mechanisms involved in the 
scaling-up process; that scaling up involves promoting wide stakeholder 
participation￿involving as many development actors as possible. 10 
•  Geographical/spatial:  that scaling project/activities involves expanding 
coverage to other communities/municipalities. 
•  Technological:  that scaling up may also mean broadening or implementing 
appropriate technologies or implementing complementary or additional 
activities/technologies to increase productivity or to better manage ecosystems 
more sustainably. 
•  Temporal:  the timing and duration of scaling up. 
•  Economic:  cost of scaling up, economic viability. 
It is useful to keep the polar opposite universalist and contextualist positions in 
mind, too, as described in Hancock (2003) and shown in Figure 3.  Universalists view 
scaling up essentially as expansion of a predesigned project, while contextualists see the 
environment as all-determining. 
Figure 3￿Universalist and contextualist perceptions of scaling up 
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Dynamics of Scaling Up 
Sequencing and timing￿the temporal dimension￿is clearly important.  
Binswanger and Aiyar (2003) refer to three sequential stages of moving toward large-
scale CDD:  
•  Initiation:  may include enhancing participation, engaging in dialogue on 
decentralization, and/or piloting CDD. 
•  Scaling up:  after a successful pilot; requires planning for training and logistics, 
and development and field-testing of manuals, etc.  
•  Consolidation:  may include going for national coverage, moving from 
participation to full empowerment, capacity development, expanding and 
deepening CDD functionally to address issues that may not have been first 
priorities, e.g., chronic malnutrition or HIV/AIDS, and/or forming networks or 
federations of stakeholders. 
Twenty-three years ago, David Korten also differentiated the dynamics of project 
effectiveness, efficiency, and expansion (quantitative scaling up) over time, highlighting 
some of the trade-offs that may be made between these three goals and emphasizing that 
scaling up is a learning process (see Figure 4). 
The learning process approach to program development proceeds through three 
stages, with each stage involving a different learning task￿effectiveness, efficiency, and 
expansion. 
•  In Stage 1, learning to be effective, the focus is on participatory assessment, 
knowledge generation (e.g., through action research and piloting), and capacity 
development. 
•  In Stage 2, learning to be efficient, the focus shifts to reducing input requirements 
per unit of output.  At this stage, there may well be some loss of effectiveness in 
exchange for efficiency, as more serious attention is now given to achieving a fit 12 
between program requirements and realistically attainable organizational 
capacities.  
 
Figure 4￿Program learning curves 
 
 
 
•  Stage 3, learning to expand, is the scaling-up stage where emphasis is on 
development of organizational capacity along with continued refinements in the 
program. 
By the end of Stage 3, the program will have become relatively stable and large 
scale (quantitative scaling-up).  The organization can then turn to finding solutions to 
new problems (functional scaling-up).  Or, if by this time the community has prospered 
as to upset the fit previously attained, there may be need to repeat the learning cycle to 
redefine the program and realign organizational capabilities accordingly (possibly 
moving toward political or organizational scaling-up). 
Clearly, there is much overlap among these many classifications.  While 
accepting that there is no one universally recommended system, we aim to proceed with 13 
Table 1 as a starting point in our enquiries, while keeping in mind the contributions 
offered by the other classifications. 
4.  Methods and Cases 
As its starting point, each case study addressed a series of crosscutting questions 
as much as was possible within the limits of the case context, available data, and the time 
frame of the project.  These questions related to different parts of the conceptual 
framework (see Box 1). 
Box 1￿Adaptable checklist of crosscutting questions 
1.  Scale, impact, vision 
Evidence of impact (small- and large-scale), degree, sustainability. 
What initial vision (scaled-up project or scaled-up impact)? 
Whose vision? Is it shared by all stakeholders? 
2.  Context and institutional and financial arrangements 
Socioeconomic, cultural, political, policy context, and trends. 
Linkages between central, local government, NGOs, community organizations, etc. 
Financing levels, flows, systems, sustainability. 
3. Capacity 
Capacity strengths and weaknesses/gaps. 
Resources (human, economic, and organizational). 
Authority, responsibility, motivation. 
Systems for monitoring, communicating, and learning. 
4. Triggers,  catalysts, ￿sparks￿ 
Internal or external? 
Accidental, spontaneous, or planned? 
5. Scaling-up  processes 
Scaling up what (what is replicable/standardizable?) 
When to scale up (phases and sequencing)? 
How to scale up? Different types of scaling-up (see taxonomy overleaf). 
 
6.  Appropriate forms of external support for CDD 
 
 
In general, the study used a mix of qualitative and quantitative methodologies and 
drew upon secondary data sources (project documents, evaluations, etc.).  This was 
supplemented, where possible, with site visits and focused key informant interviews.  14 
Following are brief descriptions of the five case studies.  Detailed descriptions are 
provided in the Annexes. 
•  Zambia.  PROSPECT (Program of Support for Poverty Elimination and 
Community Empowerment) evolved from PUSH (1992￿97) and aims to reduce 
poverty reduction in peri-urban areas of Lusaka and Livingstone through 
representative community organization.  The main foci are ￿social empowerment￿ 
(institution building), ￿personal empowerment￿ (microfinance), and development 
and maintenance of infrastructure.  Supported by CARE International (Author: 
James Garrett). 
•  Malawi.  Scaling Up HIV/AIDS Interventions Through Expanded Partnerships 
(STEPS) is a multisectoral response to HIV/AIDS comprising community 
mobilization/planning by village AIDS committees aimed at prevention, care, 
support, and mitigation.  Supported by Save the Children (US) (Author: Suneetha 
Kadiyala). 
•  Kyrgyz Republic.  Comparison of two programs:  the UNDP-supported 
Decentralization Program, which is CDD working through strengthening CBO-
LG links with emphasis on local governance.  And the DfID-supported 
Sustainable Livelihoods Program among livestock-producing communities, which 
is driven by social mobilization through ￿village working groups.￿  Catalyzed by 
a local NGO, bypassing local government (Authors: Ayse Kudat, Muge Kokten 
Finkel, and Norbek Omuraliev).DID-supported Sustainable Livelihoods Program 
among livestock-producing communities, which is driven by social mobilization 
through ￿village working groups.￿ Catalyzed by a local NGO,  local government 
(Authors: Ayse Kudat, Muge Kokten Finkel and Norbek Omuraliev) 
•  Nepal and India.  Comparison of two approaches to extending microfinance to 
the poor.  Nirdhan Utthan Bank Ltd. (NUBL) in Nepal, which extends group-
based loans to targeted clients (self-proclaimed ￿Grameen replicator￿), and the 
Self Help Group Linkage Banking Program of the National Bank for Agriculture 15 
and Rural Development (NABARD) India, which acts as an apex organization 
linking informal ￿self-help groups￿ with decentralized commercial banks (Author: 
Manohar Sharma). 
•  Kerala, India.  Kudumbashree (KDB) is a multisectoral statewide poverty 
alleviation program, based on village-level micro planning, the formation of 
￿thrift and credit societies,￿ microenterprise, and women￿s empowerment through 
social mobilization and group formation (Author: Suneetha Kadiyala). 
The criteria for choice of case studies were mixed￿we looked for geographic 
balance, though oversampling regions with a higher incidence of poverty (Sub-Saharan 
Africa and South Asia).  We also purposively selected cases from geographical and 
sectoral areas that IFPRI researchers had been, or were still, active￿to build on their 
knowledge of the context.  As mentioned, some of these cases do not fully meet the strict 
definition of fully-fledged CDD, but they nonetheless do represent attempts to scale up 
initiatives that seek to mobilize and empower poor communities.  Institutional 
arrangements differed￿the Kyrgyz UNDP-supported project aligned with example A in 
Figure 1, while Kudumbashree aligned with example C.  The most common arrangement 
was example B, partnership between CBOs and NGOs, with central or local government 
playing a supportive role. 
5.  Synthesis 
In this section, the main highlights of the case study work, supplemented with 
those of the literature review, are described as they apply to the different parts of the 
framework and the type of questions listed in Box 1.  These include both facilitating and 
constraining factors.  ￿Success factors,￿ or strengths, are outlined, while failures or 
weaknesses are viewed as challenges, with recommendations on how they might be 
addressed or prevented.  The concluding section highlights key lessons. 16 
Scale, Impact, Vision 
Patchy Data 
A major problem throughout all these case studies (and indeed elsewhere as 
described by Mansuri and Rao 2003) is that good evaluations are thin on the ground.  It is 
crucial for all stakeholders to establish basic effectiveness and impact￿first of the initial 
CDD initiative and second of the CDD scaling-up process and outcomes.  It is crucial, 
because learning and change require an understanding of what worked where and, 
ideally, why.  Donors and governments also need to be convinced of the benefits of CDD. 
From the cases, there is some evidence of increased income in Kyrgyz, near 
universal on-time loan repayment by self-help groups in the Indian NABARD program, 
and increased social capital in Malawi (less stigma and more commitment toward 
HIV/AIDS, more examples of collective action) where STEPS is active.  In general, there 
is a significant bias toward data on coverage and outputs, with few data on outcomes 
(e.g., reductions in the rate of HIV spread or in the severity of downstream impacts of 
AIDS in the case of STEPS, or reductions in poverty or malnutrition in the case of KDB).  
Where outcome data are available, they are usually not comparable with a baseline￿
either because there is no baseline, or the study design precludes valid comparison￿a 
basic failing of many projects.  A straightforward before/after, with/without design would 
provide clearer understanding of changes and how much of them were attributable to the 
project.  It would also be interesting to make more direct comparisons￿say, between a 
CDD approach and a more service delivery-oriented system. 
Quality is important￿key questions with regard to community-based structures 
might include how representative they are, how successful they are at increasing 
community participation and trust in governance, how capable they are of leading 
development, how much community residents interact with them, how they are 
incorporated into municipal planning, how financially legally and politically stable they 
are, and what needs to be done to address weaknesses.  Participation is both an end and a 
means, and needs to be viewed as such in process and outcome evaluations (see below). 17 
Context and Institutional and Financial Arrangements 
Several qualitative studies indicate that the sustainability of CDD initiatives 
depends crucially on the existence of an enabling institutional environment (Mansuri and 
Rao 2003), one in which policy and institutional reforms are oriented toward increased 
control of decisions and resources by community groups and/or participatory-elected 
local governments.  Some of the more important aspects of such an environment are 
discussed below. 
Political and Financial Commitment 
Political and financial commitment is manifested in the proactive opening up of 
space for CDD by political leaders, i.e., the creation and maintenance of an enabling 
environment.  Commitment should not be measured by policy statements alone.  
Evidence of budgetary reallocations, real policy change, and the willingness to make 
reforms (e.g., the decentralization of authority and resources) are key.  Pro-CDD legal 
mandates in the form of new decrees are common features. 
In Kerala, the system of community development societies on which KDB is 
based emerged following passage of a unique set of bylaws that empowered such groups 
to receive funds from governments, banks, and other donors.  The State Government of 
Kerala (GOK) also stipulated a statutory provision of 2 percent municipality revenue for 
poverty eradication through the CDS structures.  Women￿s participation has increased 
following the GOK reservation of local government (LGB) seats for women.  Kerala is 
quite different from most other Indian states regarding its history of social and labor 
movements, and the relative absence of socioeconomic, caste, educational, and gender 
inequalities.  Kadiyala (2004b) notes that ￿politicians in Kerala do not fear empowered 
groups.￿  On the other hand, the GOK is a bureaucracy like any other state government, 
and one in which departmentalism is rife from top to bottom; this is a constraint to 
multisectoral programming. 18 
In Kyrgyz, political stability is enhanced by continuous efforts toward 
decentralization.  Support for local self-governance is visible in many spheres.  
Municipalities (AOs) can be further encouraged to build capacity through upgrading 
qualifications of their staff, improving governance practices, establishing service 
departments, and upgrading the overall profile of the local congress in their communities.  
Donor support for decentralization is strong and translates itself into willingness to fund 
CDD activities at the AO level.  The Kyrgyz example also highlights the need to 
minimize bureaucratization, paperwork, and overregulation of CBOs in order to truly 
enable￿and not micromanage￿the CDD process. 
In Nepal, credit-based NGOs such as NUBL would not have been permitted prior 
to the shift to democracy in 1990.  Stability, too, was important, with the scaling-up of 
NUBL subsequently hampered by the Maoist insurgency.  Looking at the Asian 
microfinance programs, banking reform has been key to their expansion.  India￿s Central 
Bank classified loans to Self Help Groups (SHGs) as ￿priority sector￿ loans, providing a 
major incentive for commercial banks to lend to SHGs.  In Nepal, NUBL also received 
concessional loans from commercial banks following government regulation of at least 
12 percent of the loan portfolio to be channeled into priority sectors. 
In Malawi, the establishment of several frameworks contributed importantly to 
the successful scaling-up of STEPS.  The president declared HIV/AIDS a national 
emergency in 1999.  This was followed by the adoption of a comprehensive national 
HIV/AIDS strategic framework based on the premise that effective action to combat the 
epidemic required a multisectoral approach, implemented by a wide spectrum of partners 
within public and private sectors, and civil society and faith communities.  In 2000, the 
National AIDS Commission was established to coordinate the national response.  The 
commission was later instrumental in Malawi being awarded a major grant from the 
Global Fund.  During this time (1998￿2001), according to a study by the Policy Project, 
the policy environment in Malawi improved greatly across seven indicators.  Yet more 
mainstreaming is required￿AIDS still does not feature prominently in the current PRSP 
plan. 19 
Decentralization of Power and Resources 
The historical experience of decentralization is mixed (Binswanger and Aiyar 
2003).  Too often local governments have been created without administrative authority 
or fiscal resources.  Decentralization has three key dimensions￿political, administrative, 
and fiscal￿and all need to be harmonized to work well.  One precondition for effective 
decentralization is a high degree of central state capacity (Platteau and Abraham 2002).  
When weak states devolve power, more often than not, they are simply accommodating 
local strongmen rather than expanding democratic spaces (Heller 2001).  A process of 
￿recentralization￿￿essentially elite capture of decentralized resource flows￿has been 
documented and is discussed below. 
But there are clear benefits to decentralization.  The system of decentralized 
AIDS committees in Malawi is a major factor in the success of STEPS.  In Kyrgyz, 
political decentralization has increased trust in local leadership.  The election of local 
governments has substantially increased communities￿ trust in their elected officials and 
their belief that they can hold officials accountable.  The process of decentralization and 
local elections has also created an unprecedented opportunity for newly elected officials 
to build coalitions.  Instead of aligning themselves with the regional governors, who used 
to appoint them, local leaders now have broader networks of supporters in their own 
communities. 
Do governments need to ￿scale down￿ to provide the space for CDD to scale up?  
Scaling-down may not be a wholly accurate term for the changes that may be required.  
Conventionally, scaling-down refers to a decentralization of authority, resources, and 
capacity.  A broader definition would include the enabling, supporting, or facilitating 
function, whereby the government adopts modes of functioning that allow local 
communities and organizations to build conceptual, operational, and institutional 
capacities.  It thus refers to a shift in the balance between top-down supply and bottom-
up demand.  In finding this balance, governments and communities need to agree on 
where their respective comparative advantages lie￿CDD, for example, may work well 20 
with microfinance, while child immunizations require a more government-controlled 
approach.  Scaling-down thus does not mean the government disengages from CDD.  It 
does, however, require it to be more flexible and responsive to locally generated 
demand￿to ensure the terrain is fertile for community organizations to emerge, learn, 
and grow.  Considered in this light, for CDD to be sustained, it will be necessary for 
some direct interaction with government systems.  And for this to happen, governments, 
too, will need to change their ways of operating. 
Community Cohesiveness 
The degree of community cohesiveness is, in a sense, a measure of the degree to 
which the microenvironment is enabling.  Conversely, the fractionalization of 
communities acts as a bottleneck or even a roadblock to CDD.  Recent work by Das 
Gupta, Grandvoinett, and Romani (2003) has shown that with greater intracommunity 
equality, there is less of a trade-off between using communities￿ advantages in local 
information and elite capture.  In the Bangladesh food-for-education program, Galasso 
and Ravallion (2000) also found that power in community decisionmaking clearly 
mattered in pro-poor intra-village targeting, with greater intracommunity inequality 
associated with greater marginalization of the poor in village-level targeting. 
In Malawi, a significant difference was found with regard to the success of 
STEPS￿between rural and urban areas and between populations dependent upon 
agrarian livelihoods and those more dependent upon more individuated livelihoods such 
as tourism.  Communities with indigenous traditions of collective action and 
experimentation have a clear advantage.  In Kyrgyz, pre-Soviet and Soviet traditions, 
including the practice of ashar (in which all community members contribute to 
community projects) were important.  Use of such preexisting traditions of mutual help 
should be maximized in scaling-up, argue Kudat, Kokten, and Omuraliev (2003).  
Interestingly, the Zambian experience was different￿here the one-party state and 
socialist history was said to have reduced community initiative￿￿communities expected 
everything to come from the state￿ (Garrett 2004). 21 
Harmony and Responsiveness of Institutional Arrangements to Evolving Context 
Comparisons between the scaling-up of microfinance in Nepal and India show the 
importance of institutional responsiveness to context.  In Nepal, where commercial banks 
were thinly dispersed, NUBL adopted an approach of catalyzing group formation.  In 
India, where there is a dense network of commercial banks, an apex role of facilitating 
the linkage of groups to banks was more appropriate for NABARD. 
As activities change over time, institutional arrangements evolve and the 
configuration of actors and their interrelationships may change.  New groups may emerge 
(e.g., water-user groups in Kyrgyz) and become increasingly instrumental in prioritizing 
local needs. 
Das Gupta, Grandvoinett, and Romani (2003) describe how higher levels of 
government can form alliances with communities, putting pressure on local authorities 
from above and below to improve development outcomes at the local level.  These 
alliances can also be very effective in catalyzing collective action at community level and 
reducing local capture by vested interests. 
Working with Government and Other Structures 
There are few examples of scaled-up community development approaches that 
have bypassed government structures and been sustained.  CDD is fundamentally aligned 
with a rights-based approach to development, which holds elected governments￿as duty 
bearers￿ultimately accountable for the facilitation and fulfillment of the rights of its 
citizens.  Bypassing government may lead to the government bypassing this fundamental 
obligation.  Summers (2001) has also highlighted the risk of parallel structures 
undermining democratically-elected national governments. 
The dangers of the initial approach of PROSPECT in Zambia of avoiding 
governmental involvement was highlighted by Zambian government (GOZ) suspending 
new elections among the area-based organizations (ABOs), effectively blocking the 
scaling-up process for three years.  GOZ was increasingly being eclipsed in influence and 22 
access to donors by PROSPECT, and GOZ-elected local councilors felt threatened by a 
parallel structure with resources, albeit with no legal authority.  The hiatus ended when 
an agreement was reached and the PROSPECT ABOs were institutionalized as the lowest 
tier of government, providing stability, continuity, and authority.  Integration with 
government structures may bring greater legitimacy and provide a mechanism for 
scaling-up, but it may also bring a new dimension of vulnerability￿for example, if a 
￿new crop of councilors come into power and try to push us out￿ (Garrett 2004).  Group 
federations were considered to be one mechanism for insuring against such practices. 
In KDB in Kerala, involvement of state and local government in designing the 
pilots was considered one of the most important determinants for scaling-up the CDS 
approach.  The current director of KDB used to be the district collector of Malappuram, 
where one of the two successful pre-KDB pilots was initiated.  The embedding of KDB 
in a permanent institutional framework￿the local government bodies (LGBs) that have 
substantial funds due to fiscal devolution and a solid tax revenue￿ensures sustainability. 
In sum, government should not be bypassed, but nor should government remain 
static:  it needs to become more conducive and responsive to different types of 
community demand.  Communities should not be artificially ￿sectoralized￿ to conform to 
long-standing bureaucratic incentives that prioritize specialization.  Such incentives and 
systems need to change. 
Interdonor Coordination 
Donor compartmentalization, or ￿balkanization￿￿whether by sector or by 
geographical area￿may constrain CDD scaling.  So, too, will donor duplication where 
there is an overemphasis on a certain problem or region, potentially sucking funds from 
elsewhere.  Part of the space required for the scaling-up of CDD relates to the ability of 
external agencies to provide appropriate resources when they are demanded by 
communities (see below).  This applies primarily to local and central governments, but it 
also applies to donors.  Effective donor coordination￿in terms of who, when 23 
approached, what type of support will be provided and where￿is itself a form of 
functional scaling-up of external support. 
Capacity 
What are the essential capacity prerequisites of scaling up?  Conversely, what are 
the critical capacity gaps/weaknesses that prevent or limit it? 
A full definition of capacity development, as mentioned, is the strengthening, 
enhancing, and nurturing a community￿s abilities to take control of its own destiny and to 
manage and direct its development process through an iterative process of assessment, 
analysis, and action (see Figure 5, adapted from UNICEF 1990). 
The process of assessing, analyzing, and continuously developing different 
elements of capacity is absolutely pivotal to effective CDD.  Capacity assessment is 
essential, though not so frequently undertaken.  A critical stage of the PROSPECT 
scaling process, for example, involved a participatory appraisal and needs assessment 
(PANA)￿to keep track of problems, capacity strengths and weaknesses, and 
opportunities. 
Figure 5￿The Triple-A Cycle 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ASSESSMENT 
of the problem and 
situation.  
ANALYSIS 
of the causes of the 
problem, roles and 
patterns and capacity.
ACTION 
based on the analysis 
and available 
resources. 24 
￿Capacity￿ refers to much more than resources per se.  Attitudes, values, 
motivation￿particularly on the part of community members and government 
personnel￿are all key factors in generating and sustaining CDD at all levels.  Capacity 
assessment needs to focus on the type of capacity elements outlined in Box 2. 
Box 2￿Key elements of capacity 
RESOURCES 
   Human￿total number, skills, time, motivation, knowledge, beliefs 
   Financial￿savings, income, flow, diversity of sources, financial services 
   Social/organizational￿formal and informal institutions, e.g., family, CBOs, networks 
   Physical￿infrastructure such as transport, shelter and buildings, water supply and sanitation, 
affordable energy, and access to information (communications) 
   Natural resources￿land, water, common property resources 
 
AUTHORITY 
   Legal status of individual/organization in wider society (including traditional law) 
   Social/political legitimacy or credibility of the individual or organization  
   Mandate established within organization or in wider fora 
   Relationship to constituency￿perceived relationship by individual/organization and by 
constituency, mechanisms of representation/feedback 
 
RESPONSIBILITY/MOTIVATION/LEADERSHIP 
   Clear responsibilities corresponding to key functions in relation to goal  
   Incentives￿salaries, indirect economic benefits, professional and social status or recognition, 
training or learning opportunities, personal encouragement 
   Attitudes and values￿related to institutional norms and practices at different levels in open society 
and within organizations 
   Leadership/direction 
   Strategic vision related to relative niche 
   Credibility 
 
SYSTEMS (OF ASSESSMENT, ANALYSIS, AND ACTION) 
   For detecting and analyzing changes in the context and relevant response (i.e., problem detection 
and solving). 
   For determining particular niche given mission and mandate (i.e., positioning individual or 
organization in context vis-￿-vis other stakeholders) 
   For planning action that corresponds to context and mission/mandate 
   For analyzing, documenting, and improving own performance (or fora where analysis could take 
place) including drawing lessons from own experience and that of others 
   Existence of functioning feedback loop from action to reassessment (which permits learning) 
   Access and ownership of communication systems 
   Degree of participation in communication; connectivity of all relevant actors 
Source:  Gillespie 2001. 
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Capacity Development 
Capacity development is a process, not a one-time undertaking.  Once existing 
strengths and gaps have been assessed, strategies for developing or strengthening 
capacity can be designed.  These strategies need to be grounded in a theory of action that 
links capacity development to expected results.  The preparation of manuals or 
sourcebooks, which provide method menus and guidance, will be important here.  These 
manuals should be field-tested, adaptable, ￿living documents.￿  For example, in 
Kudumbashree, about 24 manuals were prepared to train staff at all levels (state, district, 
and local government bodies (LGBs) on various topics.  A cascade approach to training is 
followed, with KDB staff training state- and district-level resource persons in urban and 
rural LGBs, who then trigger Neighborhood Group (NHG) formation and train NHG 
members on various topics, including human resource development, micro-
entrepreneurship development, technical trainings in health and education, thrift and 
credit operations, infrastructure, convergence, and the preparation of micro- and mini-
plans. 
In NUBL, once groups have been formed, all group members undergo 
compulsory group training (CGT) to fully understand the modus operandi of group 
activities.  Completion of the training and certification by NUBL staff is required before 
lending can begin. 
The skill sets required of different stakeholders will change￿as will the activities 
within CDD￿during the scaling-up process.  In the Zambian case, for example, in the 
transition from PUSH I to II, the proportion of social development workers increased as 
that of engineers declined. 
NGO sustainability and capacity to facilitate, and ability to keep staff trained and 
motivated, are important.  In Zambia, CARE came to learn that it was important to build 
capacity by providing opportunities for communities to do something new, meaningful, 
and concrete￿to galvanize and harness the latent energy.  It also practiced what it 26 
preached and sought to empower its staff to think on its feet and remain flexible and 
adaptive in its decisionmaking. 
Several cases highlight the importance of nodal capacity support.  Save the 
Children, for example, is planning to scale-up through various innovations, including the 
establishment of community-based learning centers (CBLCs), based on the principle of 
￿seeing is learning.￿  The idea is to establish a library with all the STEPS-relevant 
documentation, and a training facility in the SC district office in Lilongwe.  In addition, 
in each of the districts, two active community AIDS committees (CACs) and four active 
village committees in each of these CACs will be chosen to serve as ￿living 
universities￿￿to train other CBOs/NGOs and AIDS committees at different levels from 
other areas.  In Kyrgyz, Rural Advisory Services has been created and supported by 
donors to ensure delivery of capacity building elements to CBOs.  These services have 
been streamlined and are expanding their scope and geographical coverage. 
Well-Defined Stakeholder Incentives, Roles, and Responsibilities 
Capacity is translated into action through motivation, which, in turn, requires 
well-defined incentives.  When considering appropriate incentives, subsidiarity is key￿
the devolution of power and responsibility for certain functions to the lowest level able to 
manage them, or as close as possible to those who will ultimately benefit.  The particular 
roles and responsibilities of different stakeholders at different levels are often spelt out, 
without being set in stone, in user-friendly operational manuals.  For the sake of clarity, 
transparency, and efficiency, such roles may need to be￿as Sharma (2004) suggests￿
￿officialized.￿ 
Incentives are required at all levels.  Examples include the availability of 
discounted refinancing rates for loans to self-help groups, which encourages local 
commercial banks in India to lend to self-help groups.  In PROSPECT, a major incentive 
for ABO membership is the chance of becoming a community facilitator. 
One incentive at the community level may be the availability of matching grants 
from the local government for good CDD proposals.  Likewise, local government bodies 27 
that are more accountable to communities may be rewarded through increased funding 
from central government.  The type of community-central government alliances 
described by Das Gupta, Grandvoinett, and Romani (2003) is another example of an 
incentive￿in this case, an incentive via a ￿double squeeze￿ for local government bodies 
to improve services to communities. 
Where commitment needs to be built in external organizations, measures to 
reward increased cooperation may include providing additional funding, entering into 
performance contracts, or developing improved monitoring systems (Heaver 2002). 
Incentives may or may not be financial.  Peer recognition, status, and the 
opportunity to learn are valuable incentives in many social programs.  Other incentives 
include performance-linked rewards such as certificates, plaques, stars, designing systems 
for recognition by the local community, initiating competition between service areas 
based on comparison of performance statistics, and rewarding performance through 
promotion. 
As well as positive incentives, there is a need to guard against disincentives￿for 
example the pervasive culture of handouts in Malawi (encouraged by the president 
himself, who frequently gives away cash on his travels within the country). 
Committed Leaders and Facilitators 
In Malawi, STEPS staff and committee members at various levels consistently 
identified local leadership as the most critical factor in generating collective action.  
Weak leadership tended to correlate with low community participation.  In Kyrgyz, the 
high level of reciprocal trust that exists between local leaders and community members 
greatly facilitated CDD, while national-level leadership was instrumental in the creation 
of an enabling environment for CDD scaling up. 
For communities to drive their own development, it is usually necessary for a 
cadre of competent facilitators to be in place￿especially at the beginning, when 
communities are being mobilized.  While social capital may be the bedrock for sustained 28 
community action, it often needs to be unlocked and activated by an external mediator or 
facilitator.  Such an activation of latent capabilities may also trigger scaling-up. 
Qualitative evidence suggests that the role of external agents, such as project 
facilitators, is a major contributor to successful CDD (Mansuri and Rao 2003).  Platteau 
and Abraham (2002) argue that endogenous community imperfections are being 
downplayed in the donor-fueled rush to decentralized or community-driven development.  
They conclude that overlooking the crucial role of external facilitators and capacity 
development in such approaches could backfire seriously and result in the appropriation 
of resources by local elites (elite capture) operating within a logic of patronage. 
The Kecamatan (KDP) program in Indonesia involved both technical and social 
facilitators with clearly defined, multiple roles￿as information provider, teacher, 
mediator, motivator, and challenger.  KDP facilitators are trained in facilitation methods, 
including structured experience and visionary observation.  Structured experience 
consists of five stages￿do and experience, express and discuss, process and analyze, 
conclude, and apply (Wong 2003). 
Capacity to Participate 
Participation is fundamental to CDD, and numerous papers have been written on 
its meaning, value, and how to promote it.  Narayan (1997) states that participation in 
community-based development depends on reversing control and accountability from 
central authorities to community organizations.  Successful design requires tapping into 
local needs, understanding and building on the strengths of existing institutions, and 
defining the changes needed in intermediary implementing agencies to support 
community action. 
With regard to CDD, participation is both a means and an end.  But participation 
of whom, in what activities, and in what way?  Case study authors were asked to consider 
the different types of involvement of key actors within their projects, with regard to the 
distinctions shown in Table 2 below. 29 
Several questioned the distinctions made in this table and the implication that 
￿collective action,￿ as defined here, was the universally optimal approach.  Many of the 
￿C￿s above could be happening in the same project at the same time.  Or a project could 
start in consultative mode and evolve and grow toward collective action.  The balance in 
most of the cases lay within consultation (e.g., the South Asian microfinance initiatives), 
cooperation, and co-learning.  One near-universal response was that the implied evolution 
in this table￿in suggesting the phasing out of facilitators￿was problematic.  
Community groups will always need to work with outsiders in some manner (see 
￿capacity to demand￿). 
Table 2￿A participatory continuum 
Mode of 
participation  Involvement of local people 
Relationship of research 
or action to local people 
Cooption  Token representatives are chosen but with no real input 
or power. 
ON local people 
Compliance  Tasks are assigned with incentives; outsiders decide the 
agenda and direct the process. 
FOR local people 
Consultation  Local opinions are asked; outsiders analyze and decide on 
the course of action. 
FOR/WITH local people 
Cooperation  Local people work together with outsiders to determine 
local priorities; responsibility remains with outsiders 
for directing the process. 
WITH local people 
Co-learning  Local people and outsiders share knowledge and 
understanding to create new understanding and work 
together to form action plans, with outsider 
facilitation. 
WITH/BY local people 
Collective 
action 
Local people set their own agenda and mobilize to carry 
it out in the absence of outsider initiators and 
facilitators. 
BY local people 
Source:  Cornwall 1996. 
 
As Mansuri and Rao (2003) found, key concepts that underlie the ￿theory￿ of 
CDD, such as ￿participation,￿ ￿community,￿ and ￿social capital,￿ are sometimes na￿vely 
conceptualized, which can lead to poor project design.  ￿Empowerment,￿ too, is an 
overused term whose meaning is often blurred.  Empowerment is not self-sufficiency, as 30 
the Uphoff quote below illustrates.  True empowerment implies control over decisions 
and resources, the capability to participate, and the capability to make demands.
2  
One reason for breaking away from thinking in terms of top-down versus bottom-up 
development is to avoid two fallacies about assisting the poor. The first is the 
paternalistic fallacy: the belief that planners, technicians, and experts possess all the 
knowledge, wisdom, and virtue needed to achieve development and that the poor should 
be responsible and grateful beneficiaries. Similarly mistaken is the populist fallacy that 
the poor themselves possess all that is needed for their own advancement, that they can 
do entirely without bureaucrats and technocrats. While there are some impressive self-
help examples and enclaves, those regional and national programmes that benefit the 
poor on a significant scale have been concurrent mutual endeavours from above and 
below. 
￿ Uphoff 1988 
 
In a recent IFPRI study of community participation in South Africa￿s public 
works programs, while there was a generally shared view among all stakeholders that the 
community should participate, there were widely divergent views as to what participation 
meant and what form it should take (Adato, Hoddinott, and Haddad 2003).  De facto 
participation (who is actually responsible) was quite different from de jure participation 
(whose name was on the contract), with the former being far more important for the 
achievement of project outcomes.  There was, in fact, no evidence that de jure 
participation affected these outcomes. 
When considering participation as a process, a means to an end, we need again to 
consider what type of capacities and incentives are required for people to effectively 
participate in furthering the goals of CDD.  Clearly, not everyone needs￿nor desires or 
is able￿to participate in all or even most activities.  Cooke and Kothari (2001) make an 
interesting and timely critique of the ￿tyranny of participation,￿ while others have 
referred to decisions being impeded or critically delayed by ￿participation paralysis￿ 
(e.g., Edwards and Hulme 2002). 
What is the balance between the participation of poorest groups and elite capture 
in scaling-up?  Even in the most egalitarian societies involving the community in 
                                                 
2 The World Bank differentiates four main types of participation along a continuum ranging from sharing 
information (one-way flow) to consultation (two-way flow) to collaboration (increased control over 
decisionmaking) to empowerment (World Bank 1998). 31 
conducting development initiatives, there is a process that will almost always be 
dominated by elites, who tend to be better educated and have fewer opportunity costs on 
their time (Mansuri and Rao 2003).  Running parallel with decentralization reform, a 
process of ￿recentralization￿ at the local and provincial levels has been documented with 
the reemergence of elites (Schonwalder 1997; VØron 2001).  Kumar and Corbridge 
(2002) provide one example in India, where ￿the Project was less successful in targeting 
the poor, than richer families were in targeting the Project.￿ 
It is not clear, however, that this always represents ￿capture￿ in the sense that 
elites appropriate all the benefits from the public good.  In PROSPECT, Garrett states, so 
long as elections are free and fair and information on candidates’ backgrounds and 
positions widely available, that those chosen for the RDC probably are elites but are also 
leaders with certain skills, education, or business acumen.  Mansuri and Rao (2003) 
likewise differentiate benevolent from malevolent capture.  Some elite domination, they 
suggest, is inevitable￿particularly where the elite are among the few who can read 
project documents and communicate with outsiders.  The risk of malevolent capture may 
be reduced in relatively homogeneous communities, but collective action is still possible 
in more heterogeneous communities with strong leadership. 
Is there a fundamental tension between participation and scaling-up?  How can 
effective participation be maintained or stimulated as initiatives grow in size?  Earlier 
reviews are inconclusive on this, in that there are examples of increasing elite capture 
with increasing scale, and examples where participation is not sacrificed overall, but may 
take on different forms for different people at different times (IIRR 2001).  The perceived 
tension between participation often stems from a political context.  In particular, there is 
frequently an adversarial relationship between NGOs and the state/government, where 
the former may reluctantly deal with the latter to mainstream their successful small-scale 
innovations.  This stereotypical characterization may be becoming less common￿the 
emerging ￿hybrid￿ paradigm seeks to combine the best of state-, NGO-, and community-
led approaches, where the state enables and nurtures the growth and contribution of 
NGOs and community groups.  Our cases differ with regard to the degree that this is 32 
evident.  In some, it is words, or policy statements, rather than action.  In others, e.g., 
PROSPECT, there are roadblocks as increasing community resource mobilization 
threatens the power of local politicians until roles, responsibilities, and mutual benefits 
are visualized and activities resumed. 
Capacity to Demand 
Communities need not only the capacity to act but to make demands.  CDD is 
thus not about self-sufficiency as much as self-reliance.  Local capacity to demand also 
needs to be matched by external capacity and commitment to respond.  One example here 
from the Kyrgyz Republic is the need for credit institutions to use existing and newly 
generated social capital as collateral (Kudat, Kokten, and Omuraliev 2003). 
In a review undertaken for the World Bank, Heaver (2002) defines commitment 
as an integral component of capacity, which aligns with the broad definition used here.  
In the medium and long run, sustained bottom-up demand from organized community 
groups is probably the best way to maintain the commitment of both policymakers and 
service providers.  Empowering households and communities to know their rights, 
understand their needs, and participate in program monitoring and management is an 
important tool for building and sustaining commitment.  In this way, communities can 
become directly involved in shaping the enabling environment within which they can 
flourish. 
Community-Based Systems for Financing, Planning, Management, and Learning  
Regarding financial arrangements, cost data were, in general, hard to come by.  
There was simply not enough readily available information to assess to what extent 
funding constrains scaling-up, the degree and type of involvement of communities in 
financing CDD, and its expansion. 
Community self-financing is not only vital for sustainability; it has also been 
shown to be important for increasing cost-effectiveness of actions.  When resources are 
locally generated, they are usually well managed (Binswanger and Aiyar 2003).  In 33 
Nepal, NUBL has seen an upward trend in its measure of financial independence or 
operational self-sufficiency (the ratio between total financial income and total expenses).  
In NABARD, a Microfinance Development Fund was established to finance scaling-up.  
The financial sustainability of PROSPECT in Zambia, on the other hand, is on shaky 
ground (Garrett 2004).  The plan to channel 5 percent of the revenues from the water 
scheme toward supporting the ABOs is poorly implemented, and it is considered unlikely 
that the municipal government will allocate funds to support ABOs, given that one of the 
motives for decentralizing was to reduce city budget commitments. 
Who decides what issues get addressed in the CDD planning process?  In the 
KDP program in Indonesia, there was an open menu￿essentially a blank sheet of 
paper￿though there was a ￿negative list￿ of activities that were effectively banned 
(including bribery, politics, use of toxic chemicals, military activities, religious buildings, 
child labor, and destruction of the environment).  Community plans need to be exactly 
that￿not an agglomeration of individual wish lists. 
What happens to issues that fall off￿or never make it onto￿the radar screen?  
As systems of planning scaled up in Kerala, KDB shifted its focus from nutrition and 
child health to microenterprise, which raises the question of whether there is ever a case 
for earmarking external support for certain activities.  Binswanger and Aiyar (2003) 
suggest that there is￿at least, with regard to problems such as HIV/AIDS, which are 
both serious, and less likely (through stigma and social exclusion) to be articulated as 
community priorities.  Acceptable criteria and mechanisms for such earmarking at 
different levels need to be agreed upon. 
A well-functioning management information system (MIS) should highlight 
bottlenecks and roadblocks for corrective action or operational research.  The MIS should 
be based as far as possible on the two main principles for the use of information for 
action￿first, to collect the minimum, feasible amount of data required to inform and 
improve decisions leading to action; and second, to maximize the use of data at the level 
they are collected (the subsidiarity principle).  Systems need to reflect the reversal of 34 
accountabilities, so that information is not routinely collected for immediate transmission 
to more central levels, but is put to direct use by communities. 
In response to the recommendations of earlier evaluations, STEPS established 
such an MIS system in 2001, with a database of 53 monitoring indicators collected at 
three main levels￿district, health catchment area, and village.  Data are collected and 
discussed monthly in local AIDS committees, then used to inform community-level 
action prior to the feeding of key information upward to higher levels.  A simple, 
transparent, streamlined MIS linking options for action with different types of 
information collected by different actors at different levels needs to be drawn up to 
support CDD upscaling.  This might include the specification of ￿trigger points￿ or 
critical thresholds for action with respect to certain indicators and certain responsible 
actors. 
Just as blueprint projects usually do not make sense in the context of scaling-up, 
nor do blueprint evaluations￿those that use close-ended questionnaires with preset 
questions and statistical analyses based on linear assumptions.  A shift toward 
participatory research and evaluation has run parallel with the move toward CDD 
approaches.  There needs to be a balance between involvement of internal and external 
evaluators, and between use of qualitative and quantitative methods.  Early work on 
community-based development (Korten 1980; Paul 1992) clearly showed that in 
successful programs, planning, evaluation, and implementation where not divorced from 
each other, and that the same individuals were involved in all to some degree.  Figure 5 
illustrates this idea well. 
Evaluations are only useful if they are used to inform and improve action.  The 
generation and sharing of knowledge between different actors at different levels, 
including communities, NGOs, and local government, is a fundamental contributor to the 
building of trust and transparency.  The link between information gathering for project 
evaluation and systems of learning and communication needs to be explicit so that 
success can be communicated, internalized, and ultimately used to generate more success.  
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￿good practice￿ both within a project (e.g., monitoring, MIS, meetings) and externally 
(e.g., networking) need to be thought through (see ￿Communicating Past Success￿ 
below). 
Triggers, Catalysts, ￿Sparks￿ 
The studies showed that the triggers or catalysts were both endogenous (e.g., a 
charismatic local leader) and exogenous (e.g., shift in donor priority), both planned and 
spontaneous.  The following were seen to be important in facilitating the move from 
small- to larger-scale modes of operation. 
Leaders and Champions 
Leaders are not only a crucial element of human capacity, as described above; 
they are also often highly influential in scaling-up.  This may be through recognizing 
and/or capitalizing on the opportunities for increasing impact, or through opening up such 
opportunities via their own endeavors.  For example, NUBL was initiated by the ex-
deputy governor of Nepal￿s Central Bank, who quit his job to pioneer NGO banking 
services in Nepal (Sharma 2004).  One early study of community-based development 
showed that stability, commitment, and continuity of program leadership were more 
important than charisma (Paul 1992). 
Communicating Past Success 
Success breeds, or at least inspires, success.  Such demonstration effects may be 
internal and/or external.  Internally, the successful implementation and impact of a small-
scale pilot may be the trigger, e.g., the urban Alleppey and rural Malappuram programs in 
Kerala, or the successful piloting of a community mobilization approach with STEPS in 
Namwera.  High repayment rates in the South Asian microfinance pilots paved the way 
for scaling-up, while the success of microcredit programs in Kyrgyz constituted an 
important trigger for emergence and scaling-up of community-driven initiatives.  Key 
bridges built between associations of microcredit groups and other CBOs facilitate a 36 
poverty-focused collaboration between CBOs and local governments for sustainable 
village-level investments, as illustrated by the UNDP decentralization pilots. 
Externally, for example, the success of the Grameen Bank in Bangladesh was a 
major influence, spawning a plethora of ￿Grameen replicators￿ in Asia￿similar attempts 
to extend microfinance to the poorest groups, particularly women.  NUBL is one 
example. 
Looking forward, there is evidence that these study initiatives are having such an 
effect themselves￿for example, there are STEPS-like models of multisectoral response 
to AIDS being adopted and adapted in Malawi, and the Mahavita program in Madagascar 
is based to some degree on PROSPECT in Zambia. 
But past success is not enough:  it needs to be communicated (see ￿community-
based systems￿ above).  The media has a key role to play in communicating successes, as 
do good internal communication strategies.  STEPS facilitates community-to-community 
interactions through its program of ￿open days,￿ wherein mobilized STEPS communities 
welcome visits from other communities￿another self-fueling mechanism for triggering 
scaling-up. 
Some of the pilots of these CDD initiatives have won awards, which have helped 
communicate their success more widely.  In 1995, the Alleppey municipality won the 
￿We, the Peoples:  50 Communities￿ award, initiated in commemoration of the fiftieth 
anniversary of the United Nations.  Malappuram also won a prestigious Commonwealth 
Association Award in 2000. 
As part of their ￿enabling￿ function, governments may facilitate communication, 
e.g., dissemination of the success of the Kyrgyz program by the Congress of Local 
Communities (the decentralization body in the Prime Minister￿s Office). 
Institutional Innovation 
Scaling-up may be initiated when a new institutional innovation becomes widely 
available, e.g., the Local Development Fund or the proposed community-based loan 
committees in Kyrgyz.  Support for the establishment of such independent loan 37 
committees, which would provide information about loans, grants, and development 
activities, has been growing since local elections in Kyrgyz.  Communities would also 
like to see this committee as a means to hold local officials accountable if they fail to 
observe fair distribution of resources (Kudat, Kokten, and Omuraliev 2003).  From the 
donors￿ point of view, such a committee could help reduce initial project costs and ensure 
sustainability of CDD initiatives after donors leave. 
New Information 
A light may be shone on critical problems or new opportunities through the 
availability of new information￿whether on problems, gaps, weaknesses, strengths, or 
potential.  A new survey may reveal gaps, e.g., the 1981 NABARD debt/investment 
survey that showed significant gaps in access to credit among the poorest.  Another study 
in 1987 demonstrated the feasibility of linking self-help groups (SHGs) directly to 
preexisting financial institutions.  This study was the trigger for this mode of scaling-
up￿that is, an apex organization focusing on catalyzing formation and strengthening of 
SHGs and linking them to a highly accessible network of commercial banking outlets.  
New information from outside may catalyze a drive toward scaling-up (see 
￿Communicating Past Success￿ above). 
Change in Context 
As discussed above, shifts in the enabling contextual environment for CDD have 
triggered/facilitated scaling-up.  Examples from the case studies include the Nepalese 
government stipulation of priority lending to most deprived sections, and a new 
government decree in Kyrgyz. 
Contextual changes may, of course, be negative, too￿simultaneously increasing 
the urgency for scaling-up while decreasing the capacity to achieve it.  One prominent 
example here is the generalized HIV pandemic in southern Africa, which has created the 
imperative to generate responses that match the breadth, depth, and scale of the impacts 38 
of AIDS.  The main district-level criteria for upscaling of the STEPS program were high 
HIV prevalence and absence of other NGOs aiming to combat it. 
Other contextual or institutional changes may be important.  A donor review 
mission, a shift in donor philosophy, or a new donor coordination mechanism may all act 
as triggers or catalysts.  In 1993, a donor mission to Zambia triggered the shift from a 
top-down, food for work program (PUSH I) to a more process-oriented, community-
driven approach￿in which actual activities were not specified￿that became PUSH II 
(the precursor to PROSPECT).  PUSH I was seen as fairly ineffective as a safety net and 
nonempowering. 
The combination of exogenous and endogenous changes in context is exemplified 
by the case of the Kyrgyz Republic.  Here, the CDD concept was initiated by donors, 
adapted by the government, and then further improvised by community-based 
organizations, which had formed around indigenous traditions of self and collective 
action. 
Scaling-Up Processes 
Key approaches to scaling-up are summarized for each case study in the Annex 2 
tables. 
Multidimensional 
Some or all of the different dimensions of scaling-up described in the taxonomy 
in Table 1 may apply simultaneously or sequentially.  Indeed, CDD projects that only 
scale up in one or two dimensions are rare. 
In Zambia, for example, in the second phase of PUSH II (1994￿97), CARE 
sought to move from direct implementation to facilitation of implementation and to 
building the capacity of the community to identify development needs and act to address 
them￿that is, from first to second generation in terms of political scale (see Table 1).  
PROSPECT then represented a multidimensional scaling-up of PUSH II quantitatively, 
functionally, organizationally, and politically.  Most important for this study, PROSPECT 39 
is an instance where a donor (DfID) and an operational organization (CARE) scaled up 
CDD in ways that it became integrated into national and municipal structures.  This has 
then allowed for widespread ￿replication￿ of CDD (Garrett 2004). 
In Malawi, STEPS provides an interesting example of multidimensional scaling, 
moving through various phases with evolving roles, activities, and donor relationships 
(Kadiyala 2004a).  The role of the donor itself (Save the Children) has changed from 
service delivery implementation to facilitating community mobilization.  More recently, 
STEPS has sought to form partnerships with other networks, including other NGOs as 
well as the government, to facilitate scaling.  Specific partnerships may be developed to 
improve the coverage or quality of specific activities, e.g., home-based care, where it 
partners with the Umoyo NGO network.  Such partnerships were not envisioned in the 
first phase of STEPS.  Again, the environment provided by the National Strategic 
Framework is conducive to such partnerships.  Niches, comparative advantages, and 
mutual benefits become clearer when organizations align with such national frameworks.  
The STEPS example also shows how scaling down￿in this case of Save the Children￿s 
role and district-level presence￿may be required to create the space, and to devolve the 
power and resources, to enable CDD scaling (see ￿decentralization￿ above). 
Project or process￿what is scalable?  Indonesia￿s Kecamatan program sought to 
scale up principles of transparency, accountability, and participation.  Binswanger and 
Aiyar (2003) speak of scaling up the principles of empowerment, accountability, and 
sustainability.  That in these cases functional scaling runs parallel to other forms of 
scaling-up suggests that it is principles, processes, and simple rules that are scalable￿not 
activities per se or specific procedures, which necessarily are governed by the local 
context from which they emerge.  For example, in Kudumbashree, it is the principles and 
process that govern local planning that are scaled up through the CDD architecture, with 
the selected activities spinning off as they are prioritized. 
Scaling-up is a learning process.  Though Korten in 1980 referred to ￿learning to 
expand,￿ perhaps ￿learning to grow￿ is more appropriate, reflecting the development of 
capabilities and opportunities as well as size.  The link to learning is through the systems 40 
of monitoring, evaluation, communications, and information dissemination described 
above. 
Variable Sequencing and Pace 
Binswanger and Aiyar (2003) differentiate three consecutive phases of 
upscaling￿initiation, scaling-up, and consolidation￿which are commonly seen, but do 
not always apply.  For example, the NABARD program went through a piloting phase 
followed by a mainstreaming phase and then an expansion phase.  Sequencing varies, as 
does the speed and the determinants of this pace.  In Kerala, the pace was set by the 
government, while in Malawi, communities themselves set the pace for scaling-up.  
Certain components take longer than others￿in PROSPECT, for example, the institution 
building component, which was inherently political, relying more on developing 
community relations, took much longer than the rollout of the water scheme.  Upfront 
capacity development will, if done properly, take time, but this is an investment, as 
progress will accelerate later when these new capabilities are unleashed. 
Anticipating and Resolving Trade-Offs 
For CDD to be effectively scaled up, there is a need for mechanisms to address 
some fundamental trade-offs.  A primary trade-off is between the conventional need to 
demonstrate short-term impacts￿through predefined inputs achieving expected 
outputs￿and the need for impacts to be sustained, which requires a slower and more 
costly startup as capacities are developed.  This to some extent parallels the distinction 
between quantity and quality, e.g., universalization of project coverage (scaling out) 
versus consolidation and deepening (functional, organizational scaling).  And there is the 
question of how to weight the increased cost of outreach to very remote areas (which may 
also be the poorest) with that of reaching more accessible communities.  There may be 
three-way trade-offs between, for example, quality, commitment/capacity, and 
speed/scale (see Figure 6).  It will be important to be aware of these and to understand 41 
that, at least initially, pushing on one or two of these objectives may affect achievement 
of the others. 
Figure 6￿Possible trade-offs 
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Appropriate Forms of External Support to CDD 
How should external support change as scaling up proceeds? How can true CDD 
align with planning structures and budget cycles and output orientation of governments 
and donors? Should donors think in terms of exit or of transition?  
There is a real need to consider the process, not just the project, in scaling up 
CDD.  The following quotation, from a neighborhood group member in Kerala, sums it 
up well:  ￿We know how to do thrift and credit.  We know who to access for trainings 
and microcredit and where.  So even if Kudumbashree is not there, we can manage.￿  Part 
of the process comprises the development of capacity to demand resources when these 
are not available at the community level. 
Uvin, Jain, and Brown (2000) suggest returning to the notion of projects as policy 
experiments rather than solutions to problems in and of themselves.  Donors need to 
balance ￿push￿ and ￿pull￿ factors.  They need to guard against falling into the ￿supply-
driven, demand-driven development￿ trap of pushing communities too hard or too fast 42 
(Mansuri and Rao 2003)￿the drive for quick time-bound results that compromise quality 
and capacity development and is anathema to a true ￿learning by doing￿ approach.  
Platteau and Abraham (2003) argue that there is no escape from a gradual approach that 
refrains from quickly disbursing vast sums over as many communities as possible.  Too 
much ￿push￿ increases the risk that local leaders will seek to gain legitimacy from 
outside rather than from their own people, possibly increasing the risk of malevolent elite 
capture.  Outside money may ￿corrupt the process of local institutional development by 
allowing leaders to eschew negotiation with members for support and material 
contributions, thereby preventing autonomous organization building based on total 
accountability of leadership vis-￿-vis the members￿ (Platteau and Gaspart 2003).  
Kadiyala (2004a) comes to a similar conclusion with regard to STEPS in Malawi:  ￿how 
finances are channeled can make or break community ownership.￿ 
Investing in thorough institutional and human capacity strengthening is a vital and 
often time-consuming first step.  External resources could then be released according to 
observable milestones in the development of absorptive capacity.  Garrett (2004) suggests 
support might be divided between capacity development, including participatory, 
community-driven planning, and funding support for the implementation of community 
proposals.  Flexibility, adaptability, and openness to change apply to all stakeholders in 
CDD processes. 
The ￿learning by doing￿ culture of CDD involves a lot of ￿learning by making 
mistakes￿ and is costly.  How much funding and time are important concerns for 
governments and donors who support CDD.  Learning-by-doing is also antithetical to a 
traditional project cycle with its linear progression from problem identification to project 
preparation, appraisal, implementation, supervision, and evaluation.  Such a project cycle 
assumes that solutions to known problems can be fully determined, budgeted for in 
advance, and implemented to a fixed timetable.  The logic of CDD runs counter to this.  
But there are positive signs of these considerations being taken on board in the realigning 
of support systems and structures.  Ultimately, more and better evaluations and better 
communications will foster learning and help reduce these constraints. 43 
When considering appropriate roles for donors, the notion of phaseout is 
dangerous terminology.  In PROSPECT, for example, at perhaps the most crucial time in 
transition￿when the need for supporting and training local structures to be sustainable 
was greatest, was just when many of the most capable staff left, fearing future 
redundancy as CARE pulled out (Garrett 2004).  In an external evaluation of STEPS in 
Malawi, Williamson and Donahue (2001) recommended ￿phase down, not phase out.￿  
Norman Uphoff stated that the concept of withdrawal or phasing out in development 
programs is almost a violation of the principles and values that make programs successful 
in the first place (IIRR 2001).  Mathie and Cunningham (2003) suggest the need for 
donors to be present with a light touch￿both ￿hands on￿ and ￿hands off.￿  The notion of 
transition￿not withdrawing but including people in a larger movement￿is more useful 
than that of exit or phaseout. 
6.  Conclusions 
As an earlier World Bank review concluded: since the success of CDD is 
crucially conditioned by local cultural and social systems, it is best done not with a 
wholesale application of best practices applied from projects that were successful in other 
contexts, but by careful learning by doing, ￿The best practice here may be the absence of 
a best practice￿ (Mansuri and Rao 2003). 
While this synthesis has described some of the more important features of 
successful CDD scaling-up, it is not possible to rank these in any way.  Some are more 
important in certain contexts, others less so.  Many interact synergistically.  With such 
interactive systems it is not possible to make useful generalizations about the relative 
importance of one factor versus another.  Rather than ranking, it is more useful to view 
these features in toto as guidance￿in terms of what to strive for (with new CDD 
initiatives) or what to look for (in evaluations).  Box 3 provides a summary of key 
lessons. 44 
The CDD paradigm is about adaptation and learning rather than mere replication.  
It values diversity over standardization and promotes synergy rather than substitution or 
competition.  Ultimately it is about processes and principles, not projects per se￿
processes that need to become anchored in national policy frameworks and embedded 
within the social, cultural, and institutional fabric of the country. 
Box 3￿Summary of Key Lessons 
•  Overall, keep in mind context, institutional arrangements, capacity, and the triggers and different 
processes of scaling-up. 
•  Donors and governments need to think of the process beyond the project, of transformation or 
transition, not exit.  They need to balance push and pull factors and avoid ￿supply-driven 
demand-driven development.￿  Community-driven is citizen-driven, not client-driven. 
•  Capacity is pivotal and is more than simply resources; it includes motivation and commitment 
that necessitates appropriate incentives at all levels.  Capacity development takes time and 
resources but is an essential investment.  The capacity and commitment of facilitators and local 
leaders is particularly important. 
•  Learn by doing￿and by communicating, monitoring, evaluating, and changing.  Learn from 
failure, but learn faster from success.  Start with the positive (what￿s working), not the problem 
(what isn￿t), and build on that.  Be adaptive, flexible, and open to change.  Anticipate and 
address trade-offs.  Apply realistic time horizons (10￿15-year, not 5-year, cycles). 
•  Build a library of well-documented, context-specific experiences through good monitoring, 
evaluation, and operational research.  Use these to advocate for improvements in the contextual 
environment. 
•  To sustain CDD, anchor it within existing contextual systems (government), frameworks (e.g., 
PRSP), and processes (decentralization), even where these may be imperfect.  Ultimate aim is to 
weave and embed sustainable CDD in national social, political, cultural, and institutional fabric. 
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Annex 1:  Case Study Abstracts 
1.  Community Empowerment and Scaling Up in Urban Areas:  The Evolution of 
PUSH/PROSPECT in Zambia (James Garrett) 
 
CARE began the Program of Support for Poverty Elimination and Community 
Transformation (PROSPECT) in 1998.  PROSPECT aims to reduce poverty in peri-urban 
areas of Lusaka.  It employs a community-based approach to carry out three types of 
activities:  social empowerment (institution building at the local level), personal 
empowerment (microfinance), and infrastructure improvement (mostly water supply 
schemes). 
PROSPECT has attempted to carry out these activities largely through its support 
of area-based organizations (ABOs) that now form part of city government.  The Zone 
Development Committees (ZDCs) and Residents￿ Development Committees (RDCs) are 
the basic components of the ABO structure.  These are community-level representations 
of municipal government; they are the community￿s mechanisms for expressing its voice 
and driving development. 
PROSPECT is itself an extension of an earlier project, PUSH II (Peri-Urban Self-
Help Project).  PUSH II and PROSPECT are fundamentally about developing 
community-based and community-driven development (CDD) mechanisms, and 
strengthening community capacities to identify and respond to community needs.  The 
paper examines the scaling-up experience of PUSH II and PROSPECT, looking 
especially at the mechanisms of CDD, the ABOs. 
Evolution of PUSH and PROSPECT 
 
PUSH I (1991￿94) was a food for work (FFW) program sponsored by the 
Government of Zambia, the World Food Programme (WFP), and the Canadian 
International Development Agency (CIDA).  The objective of PUSH was to alleviate the 46 
negative effects of structural adjustment and stabilization and the 1991￿92 drought on 
well-being and food security. 
In the second phase of PUSH, PUSH II (1994￿97), CARE sought to move from 
direct implementation to facilitation of implementation and to building the capacity of 
the community to identify development needs and act to address them.  A new donor, the 
U.K.￿s Overseas Development Administration (ODA) and CARE￿s senior staff 
encouraged this more community-driven approach.  PUSH II initiated work in three 
compounds in Lusaka and was a learning and ￿process￿ project; that is, communities 
determined project interventions only after initial participatory assessments. 
PROSPECT scaled up from 3 compounds of PUSH II to 11.  After the initial 
￿process￿ orientation of PUSH, while maintaining a community-based focus, 
PROSPECT began to revert to a more traditional project arrangement.  PROSPECT￿s 
proposal, for instance, specifically identified water provision and microfinance as 
interventions. 
Facilitating Factors and Challenges 
 
Although, supposedly, water supply was simply to be an entry point for more in-
depth work to build up the ABOs and encourage CDD, CARE￿s efforts to follow up on 
this have been less than optimal.  The two principal factors that militated against this 
seem to have been (1) political conflict between the ABOs and the traditional hierarchical 
power structures and (2) the difficulty of structuring organizational incentives to 
encourage consistent long-term actions to support CDD. 
Political tension is almost inevitable as CDD scales up.  The spreading of the 
RDCs threatened the authority of the city councilors, who traditionally had been in 
charge of development in the compounds (although not necessarily very effective).  With 
PROSPECT, residents saw the RDCs managing substantial resources and promoting 
investment beneficial to the community.  The RDCs were an emerging threat to the 
councilors￿ status.  In 1999, the council suspended further RDC elections.  In response, 
CARE worked with stakeholders to develop a new legal framework for RDC and council 47 
relations.  Elections only resumed in mid-2002, so for almost three years, the ABO 
structure was not fully operational.  (Some project activities continued as the suspension 
only affected new elections, but the conflict cast a pall over ABO, CARE, and council 
relations.)  The result of the suspension has been a more robust legal framework for the 
ABOs and, as a significant step forward for scaling up of CDD, integration of the ABOs 
into the municipal government structure and its spread to all peri-urban compounds in 
Lusaka (even those where CARE does not work).  Still, the crisis showed how significant 
an obstacle politics can be to CDD and scaling-up. 
The political conflict between the ABOs and the city councils illustrates the 
necessity of involving government structures, rather than ignoring them, in promoting 
CDD, especially in urban areas.  To resolve the crisis, PROSPECT worked with the city 
council and ABOs so that everyone understood their roles.  CARE￿s position as an 
important international NGO with resources to fund the dialogue and to meet some 
community needs possibly allowed them to play that mediating role in a way that a less 
prestigious or less well-funded organization could not.  Scaling up CDD may thus require 
the prestige and resources of an outside catalytic change agent and almost certainly 
requires that stakeholders￿ and participants￿ roles and responsibilities are clarified from 
the beginning and quite possibly ￿officialized￿ in some way. 
The history of PUSH II and PROSPECT also illustrates the organizational 
difficulty of supporting CDD.  Despite PUSH II￿s initial emphasis on CDD and 
empowerment, PROSPECT over time came to focus more on promoting specific 
interventions (water provision, microfinance) than on energizing CDD in a sustainable 
way.  This is not entirely surprising, given the genuine community need for water, 
external evaluations that encouraged water schemes, and donors that stressed outputs 
over process.  As a result, the focus shifted from process to specific activities of 
previously determined project components.  PROSPECT￿s own monitoring and 
evaluation system also focused more on outputs or their impacts than on indicators of 
effectiveness and sustainability of ABOs.  Efforts to support CDD thus will require 48 
changes in project design and performance indicators, and in donor perspectives and 
expectations. 
Other factors were also important in shaping CDD.  Democratization and a 
national policy of decentralization, along with encouragement from key CARE staff, 
encouraged a community-based approach to development.  Project management was 
careful to train staff in participatory methods.  This was important for them to understand 
how to promote CDD.  Project and mission management￿s own insistence on 
decentralizing authority and empowering staff further enhanced this thrust.  All this 
created a national and institutional environment important to promoting CDD. 
Funding continues to be a severe challenge to sustainability.  Neither Council nor 
ABOs have adequate resources to build capacity or implement projects to meet identified 
needs.  Without resources to meet community demands, CDD becomes a hollow exercise 
and structures will wither. 
The evolution of PROSPECT suggests that the nature of support to CDD will 
change over time.  The promoting organization therefore must be a learning and 
empowering organization.  Initial promotion of CDD may involve establishing local 
structures and working to create an enabling environment, but the supporting 
organization must move to build their capacity on a number of fronts, including needs 
identification, project design, fund-raising, and project management.  As community, 
municipal, and national structures become stronger, the promoting organization will need 
to move from the center to the side.  It may still be involved in strengthening 
organizations and shaping the enabling environment, but the skills and activities required 
to do this are very different from those required at the beginning, when the institutional 
landscape is more barren.  The promoting organization itself must be ready for this, and 
think in terms of transforming its support (activities, funding focus, and staff numbers 
and skills), rather than simply ￿shutting down￿ or ￿exiting.￿ 
The study also finds that scaling-up occurs rather naturally along a number of 
different dimensions over time.  In PROSPECT￿s case, not only were the ABOs 
ultimately integrated into the social and institutional fabric of urban government in 49 
Lusaka, but PROSPECT￿s approach had impact beyond the project itself.  Seeing a need 
for project learning and documentation, CARE instituted a new project, Urban INSAKA.  
CARE￿s C3 is a relatively new project that, like the Zambian Social Investment Fund, 
funds community initiatives, thereby supporting CDD with responsive resources.  CULP 
has repeated PROSPECT￿s approach in three more cities in Zambia, while Mahavita has 
transferred the experience to Antananarivo in Madagascar.  These last examples of 
scaling-up depended to a great extent on the international reach of CARE and key 
advisors who took the experiences, structures, approach, and lessons from PROSPECT 
and transferred them to other locations. 
2.  Scaling Up HIV/AIDS Interventions through Expanded Partnerships (STEPs) in 
Malawi (Suneetha Kadiyala) 
 
This paper discusses the factors that are enabling and constraining the scaling up 
of STEPs,
3 supported by Save the Children U.S (SC), to combat HIV/AIDS in Malawi.  It 
also discusses some potential threats to and contextual factors limiting scaling-up.  This 
report draws primarily upon the available literature and qualitative data collected during a 
five-day visit to SC Malawi in December 2002. 
STEPs started in 1995 (then called Community-Based Options for Protection and 
Empowerment, STEPS) as a service-delivery program in one district in Malawi, 
Mangochi, to assist children affected by HIV/AIDS.  Through evaluations, SC realized 
the approach was unsustainable, cost-ineffective, and not scalable.  Based on the 
recommendations of the evaluations and the field experience, the program revitalized the 
dormant decentralized AIDS committees (at district, community, and village levels) and 
their technical subcommittees, under the National AIDS Commission (NAC), in the 
Namwera community in Mangochi, to mobilize collective action to combat the epidemic. 
                                                 
3 Until June 2003, STEPs was known as Community-Based Options for Protection and Empowerment 
(STEPS).  However, for the sake of legal issues involved in the use of the acronym STEPS due to 
copyrights, we use STEPs throughout the paper.  However, the readers should interpret STEPs as STEPS 
before June 2003. 50 
Based on the positive experience in Namwera, the program changed its initial 
strategy to that of an external change agent, assisting communities with community 
mobilization and capacity building so that communities become empowered to act 
collectively to address their own problems.  Village AIDS Committees (VACs) identify 
the vulnerable; plan responses on the basis of the nature and magnitude of vulnerability 
within the villages, needs of the vulnerable, and capacity within the villages to respond.  
They also monitor the activities and mobilize resources.  As the needs of the most 
affected communities are crosscutting, the program evolved into a truly multisectoral 
program with activities along the continuum of prevention, care, support, and mitigation.  
STEPs has also been influencing national policies related to HIV/AIDS and children. 
STEPs now functions in four districts and aims to expand to two more, covering a 
total of 15 percent of Malawi￿s population by 2005.  Through partnerships and training, 
other NGOs/CBOs in the program approach of community mobilization and facilitating 
collective action, STEPs and similar models aim to cover 75 percent of Malawi￿s 
population. 
Contextual factors critical for scaling-up include an enabling policy environment 
with a strong commitment of the current government, especially NAC, to a multisectoral 
approach of combating HIV/AIDS.  Organizational factors enabling scaling-up include a 
well-trained and motivated staff, adoption of a community mobilization model through 
capacity building of the district, community and village AIDS committees, commitment 
to document and disseminate lessons learned, and reaching more affected populations 
through partnerships.  Factors specific to communities include leadership within the 
community, whether they are urban or rural (rural communities are easier to mobilize 
than urban), the nature of livelihoods, and history and culture of the communities with 
respect to collective action.  Planning along with the communities for a phasing down of 
SC￿s presence and scaling up of the role and responsibilities of the AIDS committees and 
funding mechanisms that do not threaten community ownership of the problem and 
response have also been identified as critical in enabling and scaling up sustainable 
collective action. 51 
Important factors that threaten or limit the scaling up of STEPs include the 
magnitude of the epidemic eroding community resources, the current food crisis that is 
diverting resources to sheer survival, the gap between the resources that communities 
need to make a visible change and what they have access to consequently (undermining 
the spirit of volunteerism), weak commitment of donors to a truly community-driven, 
multisectoral response, and the overall context of poverty and underdevelopment in 
which it takes longer to mobilize communities and build their capacities. 
3.  Kudumbashree:  Collective Action for Poverty Alleviation and Women￿s 
Empowerment (Suneetha Kadiyala) 
 
This paper discusses the factors that enabled and constrained the scaling up of a 
multisectoral poverty alleviation program called Kudumbashree, initiated by the 
government of Kerala (GOK) in 1998 to eradicate poverty by 2008.  It also discusses 
some potential threats to, and trade-offs of, scaling up Kudumbashree.  This report draws 
primarily upon the available literature and qualitative data collected during a five-day 
visit to Kudumbashree in March 2003. 
In 1991, the GOK, along with UNICEF, initiated the Community-Based Nutrition 
Program (CBNP) in Alleppey town to improve the health and nutritional status of 
children and women.  CBNP facilitated collective action by forming and developing the 
capacity of three-tiered community development societies (CDS), the members of which 
are exclusively women.  Women from families identified as poor, using a nine-point non-
income-based index, were organized into neighborhood groups (NHGs) comprising 20-
45 families.  NHG members elected a five-member committee called the NHG committee 
(NHGC) to coordinate and facilitate action at the NHG level.  The NHGs were federated 
at ward level as an area development society (ADS).  The ADSs were then federated at 
the municipal level as a CDS. 
Based on the positive experiences in urban Alleppey, and subsequently in rural 
Malappuram, the GOK scaled up the CDS strategy to the entire state in 1998 under the 
name Kudumbashree.  The State Poverty Eradication Mission implements Kudumbashree 52 
through the department of Local Self Governments (LSG), formed and empowered in 
1992 by the 73
rd and 74
th Constitutional Amendments.  Convergence of various 
government programs and resources at the CDS level, participatory antipoverty planning 
and implementation, formation of thrift and credit societies, and development and nurture 
of microenterprises are the key Kudumbashree strategies. 
Our findings show that an enabling environment, especially decentralization and 
the concurrent devolution of finances to the local government bodies (LGBs), was critical 
in scaling up Kudumbashree.  The CDS structures are now considered as a further step to 
decentralization.  As the CDS structures are affiliated to the LGBs, their financial 
sustainability is ensured through various modalities, e.g., through convergence, Women￿s 
Component Plan and earmarked assistance to women￿s self-help groups (SHG).  The 
unique context of Kerala, coupled with leadership of a few, motivated and innovative 
officials, was also key in both the decentralization process as well as the scaling-up of 
Kudumbashree. 
Kudumbashree itself is an interdepartmental initiative, making it conducive for a 
multisectoral response to poverty.  Other institutional arrangements, such as partnerships 
with the central government and the National Bank for Agriculture and Rural 
Development (NABARD), continue to play a role in an expanded response to poverty 
alleviation through CDS structures.  Training and capacity building of the LGBs and the 
CDS/ADS/NHGs were critical in building ownership. 
Two factors initially constrained the scaling-up process.  The government initially 
wanted to include all women, not just those below the poverty line in the CDS structures.  
The negotiations between various stakeholders delayed the process by a year and a half.  
Many LGBs resisted strengthening of the CDS/ADS/NHGs, as they perceived them to be 
a threat to their authority.  This still continues to be a problem in many gram panchayats. 
The potential threats and trade-offs include a shrinking focus on maternal child 
health and nutrition issues with an increasing preoccupation with microenterprise 
initiatives.  The quality of collective action needs to be further strengthened.  The current 53 
plans tend to be a catalogue of individual needs with group needs often not addressed, 
and there are signs that the NHG/ADS/CDSs are becoming bureaucratic. 
4.  Scaling Up Microfinance in South Asia (Manohar Sharma) 
 
This case study examines the scaling-up experiences of two microfinance 
institutions:  the Nirdhan Utthan Bank Limited (NUBL) in Nepal and the Self-Help 
Group (SHG)￿Bank linkage program of the National Agricultural Bank for Agriculture 
and Rural Development (NABARD) in India. 
Both NUBL- and NABARD-groups use self-regulation (peer selection, peer 
monitoring, and peer enforcement of contracts) as key to access services otherwise not 
accessible to them.  There are two community-based drivers.  Loan products are heavily 
driven by clients￿ preferences as evidenced by strong demand to join the program, high 
repayment rates, and very low dropout rates.  Second, the process of organizing clients 
into groups itself has a significant empowering effect, providing voice￿and the attendant 
bargaining power￿to an impoverished class, when there was none before. 
Standardization of rules of conduct and basic service delivery mechanisms (and 
also financial products in the case of NUBL) was key to swift replication in both India 
and Nepal.  In Nepal, where the density of banking services was low, NUBL chose to be 
the financial service provider itself.  In India, where this density was already very high, 
NABARD recognized the core advantages of group-based finance, but decided to 
facilitate linkage banking instead. 
The NABARD experience is government-led.  NUBL, on the hand, was 
established as an alternative to government action.  However, in both cases, government 
policy in the form of mandatory ￿priority sector￿ credit played￿and continues to play￿a 
critical role in facilitating expansion.  The subsidy content (explicit and implicit) of both 
NUBL and the NABARD program is quite high, and continued expansion of both 
programs is highly conditional on whether the policy regime of directed credit continues 
in the future.  Any change in this policy will deal a severe blow to both of these 
institutions. 54 
Provisioning group-based credit is costly in that it is highly staff time-intensive.  
In the case of NUBL, staffing requirements are so high that it has so far not been possible 
to scale up services in remoter and more sparsely populated mountainous areas of Nepal.  
In India, expansion of services in the remoter northeastern states has been hindered by the 
high cost of setting up and operating SHG promoting institutions.  One option in both 
countries is to induce the development of group federations that eventually become self-
financing and self-regulating.  Instances of well-functioning group federations are 
emerging in parts of India, and federations may well be the key to consolidating the gains 
made so far, ensuring that the programs are primarily driven by the interests of clients, 
and eventually weaning them from subsidies. 
Finally, quality of the broader national environment is very important in 
facilitating growth of institutions.  NUBL￿s growth leveled off exactly when expansion of 
SHGs accelerated in India.  This was not a coincidence.  The Maoist insurgency in Nepal 
severely restricted the development of the microfinance sector while the supporting 
environment in India facilitated its unparalleled expansion. 
5.  Community-Driven Development in the Kyrgyz Republic:  Evaluating the 
Potential for Scaling Up (Ayse Kudat,Muge, Kokten Finkel, and Nurbek Omuraliev) 
 
This case study discusses issues for scaling up in light of the lessons learned from 
rural community-driven initiatives in the Kyrgyz Republic.  To compare the processes 
and analyze the system-wide and household-level impacts of alternative CDD projects, 
the study focuses on two programs:  UNDP￿s Decentralization Program and DfID￿s 
Sustainable Livelihoods Program. 
The study demonstrates that there are important similarities between the processes 
embedded in the pilots of the two programs.  Both programs adopt a multisectoral 
approach to development, supporting social mobilization for microcredit, providing 
advisory services for agricultural and livestock production, and supporting individual- or 
group-based enterprise activities.  Both projects try to strengthen CBOs and their 
capacities for business planning and project implementation.  However, they differ in 55 
their core principles and their institutional arrangements, which, in turn, affect not only 
the steps of their impacts but also their potential for scaling up nationwide.  The UNDP 
program aims to bolster transparent and accountable local governments that are able to 
work with their citizens in a sustainable manner with locally owned and generated 
resources.  Hence, it works with CBOs, local governments, and their representation at the 
national level, the Congress of Local Communities, and installs incentives for 
cooperation between all three parties.  It also has a higher level of commitment with 
respect to both financial and human resources.  As a result, the program￿s procedures are 
fully incorporated into the national institutional structures and policies, providing a solid 
chance for national scaling-up.  In comparison, the DfID program bypasses local 
governments and works directly with villagers through elected working groups.  It 
experiments with innovative techniques for farming, livestock breeding, and collective 
resource management to improve the livelihoods of the communities.  Hence, it 
emphasizes capacity building and shared systems of information, making these 
experiences significant for efforts to scale up CDD. 
The Kyrgyz experience concludes that several facilitative national and contextual 
factors are crucial for scaling up CDD successfully, including the political commitment 
to decentralization, a positive agrarian economic environment supporting microcredit and 
village-based development initiatives, a relatively educated labor force, and, most 
important, indigenous self-help mechanisms and previous exposure to community-based 
projects.  Programs that utilized existing mechanisms of self-help and social mobilization 
have been more successful in expanding the reach of their projects and keeping costs 
down.  Donor coordination and experience sharing have also had a positive impact for 
scaling up, as projects can build on each other￿s experiences.  Institutional innovations, 
such as the Local Development Fund in the Kyrgyz Republic, have also been very 
effective when there exists a serious commitment from donors and institutional support 
from the national policymaking processes and authorities. 
At the same time, the Kyrgyz experience also highlights continuing challenges to 
successful CDD scaling-up in the future.  Among the challenges are incomplete efforts of 56 
fiscal decentralization, prevailing high rural poverty rates, excessive regulations 
concerning the activities of CBOs, bureaucratization of microcredit applications, and the 
absence of crediting procedures that reward and utilize existing and generated social 
capital through collective projects. 57 
Annex 2:  Case Study Summary Tables 58 
PROSPECT in Zambia 
INSTITUTIONAL 
ARRANGEMENTS 
 
 
Funder: PROSPECT: ODA (now DFID); PUSH II: also WFP 
 
ABOs (RDCs and ZDCs), the focus of this study, are responsible for overall community 
development and liaison with Lusaka City Council (LCC) 
CAPACITY 
ELEMENTS 
Training of ABOs, councilors and council staff (leadership, democracy, conflict resolution, 
gender, etc.) 
Working with councilors and council staff to develop policies and programs  
TRIGGERS 
 
 
ODA review mission and focus on process projects 
CARE￿s desire to continue work in peri-urban areas once PUSH I ended 
CARE senior staff commitment/background in participatory development 
FACILITATING 
FACTORS 
 
 
National policy of decentralization, need for community representation 
Need to bring periurban areas under municipal authority  
Recognition that national/municipal government did not have resources to supply services 
Donor (funding, philosophy) and country mission support 
Capacity building among staff in participatory methods/learning organization 
Partnered with government  
Had resources available 
Prestige and ￿weight￿ of CARE 
Began smaller and grew over time 
LIMITING 
FACTORS/ 
CHALLENGES 
Government lack of interest 
Political obstacles 
Donor frameworks and requirements  
Focus on outputs, budget setups, and cycles, M&E indicators 
Resources to respond and build capacity 
Staff capacity and skills 
Sustainability of focus on community over time 
Transformation and transition 
Staff, funding lines, stakeholders, activities 
Weaving sustainable CDD into social and institutional fabric 
Spreading to other 
SCALING UP 
PROCESSES 
 
Quantitative  
Scaling Up 
 
Expanded operations from 3 to 11 compounds 
Facilitated integration of ABO into municipal governance structure for all compounds 
Assisted in finding funding for ABO initiatives 
Functional  
Scaling Up 
 
Added environmental health, gender, and HIV/AIDS components 
Linked with other projects like KAR (urban waste management program)  
ABOs constructed clinics and police posts and community centers 
Expanded down to create and support ZDCs 
Supported creation of ABO federation 
Expanded up to build capacity among council staff and councilors, and sit on national boards 
Political  
Scaling Up 
 
Service delivery: FFW built infrastructure (PUSH I)  
Community capacity development: redirected ABOs 
Policy reform: integration of ABOs into local governance structure; member of NDCC; 
promotion of federation of ABOs 
Social movements/leadership entry into politics: some RDC members have become 
councilors  
Organizational  
Scaling Up 
 
 
Cross-training and cross-sectoral coordination of CARE staff  
Training of ABOs and LCC members, council staff  
Connecting ABOs to water schemes for revenue 
Assisting with finding donors, writing proposals 
Spin-offs and incorporation of RDCs in other structures  
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STEPs in Malawi 
INSTITUTIONAL 
ARRANGEMENTS 
 
 
Partnership with DACC/CAC/VAC is central to the STEPs strategy. 
Partnership with other NGOs/CBOs to build their capacity in initiating STEPs-like 
models in other districts; to leverage their presence within the same district 
Partnership with NAC and capacity building of CBOs is the primary mode of 
scaling-up in the next phase of STEPs. 
CAPACITY ELEMENTS 
 
Community mobilization has been critical in building capacity. 
Training at various levels (DACC/CAC/VACs) critical 
Funding issues continue to constrain capacity building of the AIDS committees. 
TRIGGERS 
 
 
Few visionaries in SC 
The success community mobilization model in Namwera was a trigger to expand 
the strategy to other districts. 
Within districts, communities themselves have been catalysts. 
FACILITATING 
FACTORS 
 
 
Decentralization of AIDS committees to district, community and village levels 
Working through the existing structures 
An enabling policy environment 
Institutional arrangements 
SC￿s ability to attract and retain high-quality staff and keep them motivated 
through training, encouraging innovation, and competitive salaries 
LIMITING FACTORS 
 
 
Inadequate training of the DACC/CAC/VAC members 
Inadequate funding 
Other factors, such as the magnitude of the epidemic, the ongoing food crisis, 
weak commitment of donors, lack of a full-time DACC coordinator, and the 
overall context of poverty and underdevelopment 
SCALING UP PROCESSES   
Quantitative 
Scaling Up 
 
The community mobilization model, revitalizing DACC/CAC/VAC structures 
replicated in the four districts 
Other NGOs are also adopting a similar strategy in other districts of Malawi and 
elsewhere. 
Functional 
Scaling Up 
 
From primarily a psychosocial orphans support project, STEPs evolved into a 
multisectoral initiative addressing issues along the continuum of prevention, 
care, support, and mitigation. 
Political 
Scaling Up 
 
Through STEPs, SC is influencing national policies:  It was a member of the 
National Orphan Task Force of Orphan and played a key role in drafting 
guidelines for orphan care in Malawi; leading member of Children and Violence 
Task force; formation of Wills and Inheritance Core group. 
Organizational 
Scaling Up 
 
As STEPs scaled up, it recruited an HBC and an M&E officer.  Plans for recruiting 
additional staff to scale up. 
STEPs is scaling up partnering with the organizations, including the government.  
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Kudumbashree in Kerala, India 
INSTITUTIONAL 
ARRANGEMENTS 
 
 
An interdepartmental government initiative  
Partnership with UNICEF was critical in the initial stages. 
Strong partnerships with LGBs, various line departments, the central government, 
NABARD, and other commercial banks 
Uneasy relationship with the NGOs 
CAPACITY ELEMENTS 
 
 
The nature of the initiative (cutting across departmental lines) enables 
multisectoral action. 
Training at various levels (Kudumbashree staff, LGB leaders, CDS/ADS/NHG) 
critical  
Financial sustainability through convergence, WCP 
TRIGGERS  Alleppey and Malappuram CNBP were triggers. 
FACILITATING 
FACTORS 
 
Decentralization and fiscal devolution was the catalyst in setting pace. 
Leadership of a few motivated government officials 
TCS and microenterprises 
LIMITING FACTORS 
 
 
Inadequate training at the LGB and CDS/ADS/NHG levels to build ownership due 
to the rapid and mandatory pace of scaling up 
Political interference and bureaucracy of the CBOs themselves 
SCALING UP PROCESSES   
Quantitative 
Scaling Up 
CDS/ADS/NHG structures replicated in the entire state 
Functional 
Scaling Up 
 
A multisectoral initiative with an increasing emphasis on reaching the destitute 
and children.  From primarily a nutrition initiative, it scaled up to include 
microenterprises, etc. 
But scaling up to other activities has reduced the focus on maternal and child 
health and nutrition.  
Political 
Scaling Up 
CDS/ADS/NHG structures are considered as a further step to decentralization. 
CDS are considered to be the ￿wings￿ of the LGB. 
Organizational 
Scaling Up 
Kudumbashree was set up in 1998 with the explicit function of undertaking the 
program to alleviate poverty in Kerala.  
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Microfinance in Nepal and India 
  Nirdhan Utthan Bank Limited (NUBL)  Self Help Group ￿Bank Linkage Program of the National 
Bank for Rural Development (NABARD), India 
INSTITUTIONAL 
ARRANGEMENTS 
 
 
Incorporated as Development Bank. Subject to 
prudential banking laws and supervision by 
Nepal￿s central bank. Governed by a Board of 
Directors selected from among shareholders. 
Expected to issue shares to clients in near 
future and representation of clients on Board 
expected after that. Currently capitalized at 
Nepalese Rs 10 million. 
Provides group-based loans to targeted clients.  
Self-help groups (SHG) are informal, but banks are authorized 
to conduct formal financial transactions with them. 
NGOs or commercial banks help form these groups. 
NGOs receive financial assistance from NABARD, and 
commercial banks may refinance loans to SHGs from 
NABARD at a special rate.  
NABARD was created in 1982 by a Special Act of parliament 
and jointly owned and funded by the government of India and 
India￿s central bank. NABARD is an apex institution, 
accredited with all matters concerning policy, planning and 
operations in the field of credit for agriculture and other 
economic activities in rural areas in India. It is capitalized at 
Indian Rs20 billion.  
CAPACITY 
ELEMENTS 
 
 
Professional senior management staff.  
Fieldworkers hired locally and trained.  
Currently developing MIS critical for further 
expansion.  
Recently set up microfinance development fund to scale up 
linkage program. Staff capacity in training and promotional 
activities adequate. 
TRIGGERS 
 
 
Personal commitment of founder and CEO who 
quit position as deputy governor in Nepal￿s 
central bank to start NGO banking services.  
Establishment of credit-based NGO only 
possible after democratic rule started in 1990. 
Used Grameen methodology that was successful 
in neighboring Bangladesh. 
Donor support based on demonstration of sound 
management and poverty outreach. 
Debt-investment survey of 1981 showing inadequate access to 
banking services by the rural poor triggered experimentation 
and piloting.  
Demonstration of success by Grameen Bank in neighboring 
Bangladesh led to adoption of group-based approach.  
High density of preexisting branches of commercial banks led to 
adoption of the linkage approach. 
 
FACILITATING 
FACTORS 
 
 
Banking law requiring commercial banks to 
invest in ￿deprived sector￿ has resulted in easy 
access to loanable funds. 
High repayment rates  
Nationalized banking system is heavily regulated by central 
bank. 
Central bank directive making it possible to open group 
accounts 
Pre-existing NGOs that could be tapped to promote SHGs 
Subsidy grant from central bank and government India 
Banking laws on ￿priority sector lending￿ 
High repayment rates 
LIMITING FACTORS 
 
 
Low capitalization 
Inadequate management information system  
Group based method highly staff-intensive￿cost 
of service delivery high in remoter areas 
Excessive dependence on donor funds and 
priority sector credit 
Maoist insurgency  
Remoter regions lack preexisting NGOs to promote groups 
Remoter regions lack bank branches 
Excessive dependence on subsidy and financial sector regulation
SCALING UP 
PROCESSES 
Expansion rate in tandem with management 
capacity, experience  
Intensification of services within established 
areas of operations rather than scaling up 
across districts.  
Intensive promotion of SHG banking among NGOs and bank 
management through outreach, education, and training 
Assured refinancing SHG loans from NABARD made it 
attractive for participating banks. 
Distinct periods of piloting, mainstreaming, and scaling up  
Quantitative  
Scaling Up 
 
From 125 clients in 1993 to 35,268 clients in 
2001. Number of clients leveled off after 
2001due to Maoist insurgency.  
From 225 SHGs in 1992 to 566,826 SHGs in 2003. Unevenness 
of growth regionally, however. 
Functional  
Scaling Up 
 
Some diversification in loan products achieved: 
group loans supplemented by voluntary 
savings accounts, house loans, individual-
based loans, and livestock insurance.  
Three flexible linkage models developed 
Flexibility in loan size, purpose, and loan terms introduced to 
match clients￿ demand 
Political  
Scaling Up 
 
Firmed position by incorporating as development 
bank. Was successful attracting investment 
from private sector banks. Well-known 
banking personalities sit on governing board. 
Scaled up a national-level program. Position firmed by strong 
financial backing from central bank and central government. 
Organizational  
Scaling Up 
 
Area based management structure with each area 
office reporting to headquarters. New MIS 
being developed currently. 
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Kyrgyz Republic 
 UNDP-PAC  UNDP-DE DfID-SLLPC 
INSTITUTIONAL 
ARRANGEMENTS 
 
Partnerships between SHGs, 
SHGAs, and LGs. 
Direct partnerships between 
CBOs, LGs, and central 
government through CLC  
Partnerships between elected 
village working groups and 
NGOs/private firms 
CAPACITY 
ELEMENTS 
 
 
KAFC and RAS 
Local UNDP activists 
Meaningful microcredit 
opportunities 
KAFC and RAS 
Local UNDP activists 
Meaningful micro capital grant 
and Local Development Fund 
opportunities 
KAFC and RAS 
International experts until a 
core team is trained 
Training seminars and small 
credit opportunities 
TRIGGERS 
 
 
Institutional commitment to 
poverty reduction 
Close cooperation with national 
decentralization strategy 
Encouraging results from 
CDD projects in other CAS, 
previous with the GoKR, and 
the WB  
FACILITATING 
FACTORS 
 
 
Indigenous traditions of self 
help; trained local activists 
PAC experience; cooperation 
with CLC; trained local 
activists; substantial budget; 
national commitment to 
decentralization 
Institutional support from 
KAFC and RAS; pilot 
communities￿ previous 
exposure to CDD through 
PAC  
LIMITING 
FACTORS 
 
 
SHGs are not formalized except 
for credit applications, don￿t 
have permanent roles at LGs; 
depressed housing markets 
minimizing chance for 
collateral; high interest rates 
Registration fees and taxes for 
CBOs and CBO associations; 
excessive paperwork and 
corruption; lack of integration 
of social capital into 
collective collateral processes 
No incentives for working 
groups to cooperate with 
LGs, possible competition; 
not enough funding for the 
projects themselves 
SCALING UP 
PROCESSES 
   
Quantitative  
Scaling Up 
 
Already active in 7 oblasts, and 
in more than 150 of the 487 
LGs 
Easy with low initial costs due 
to collaboration with CLC, 
and already significant: 531 
CBOs are active in 15 pilot 
AOs, 543 CBOs active in 
nonpilot AOs. 
Emphasis has been on nurture; 
spread and replication has 
been sporadic; integration 
has not been pursued. 
Functional  
Scaling Up 
 
Both horizontal and vertical 
scaling-up has been achieved. 
Ongoing; vertical scaling up is 
more pronounced than 
horizontal scaling up. 
Horizontal scaling up is 
integral to the project; and 
has also been successful in 
vertical scaling up. 
Political  
Scaling Up 
 
First and second generation are 
achieved, third may be 
achieved naturally. 
Achieved full political scaling 
up 
First and second generation 
scaling-up is achieved, third 
is planned, fourth is not 
pursued actively.  
Organizational  
Scaling Up 
 
 
Achieved internal management 
and institutional 
diversification, financial 
viability may require more 
time. 
Achieved internal management, 
financial viability and is most 
successful at internal 
institutional diversification. 
Achieved internal 
management and financial 
viability, not pursued 
institutional diversification 
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